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Since 2001, members of the U.S. military and Afghan communities have been living alongside each other 
as part of the international political intervention and military campaign Operation Enduring Freedom.  A 
schism occurred between Afghan societies in relation to this involvement, which in turn produced 
relationships between foreign troops and Afghan civilians, the state apparatus and insurgents. An 
international discourse of propaganda using gender as a tool surrounded the conflict and attempted to 
justify the presence of foreign militaries in Afghanistan by framing the U.S. as rescuers, liberating Afghan 
victims from Afghan oppressors. A counterinsurgency doctrine was developed after Afghanistan resisted 
the international hegemonic vision for the country, asking troops to battle for the hearts and minds of 
Afghans.  U.S. troop’s reflections about their experiences in Afghanistan reveal a division in how these 
roles and relationships are imagined in the propaganda and doctrine and how they are experienced by 
the U.S. military’s service members. The relationship with Afghan communities is problematized and 
given context in this project as remembered and perceived by the U.S. troops. Representations were 
deconstructed and reconstructed by the troops revealing the perception of themselves and Afghans, the 
roles of the groups and the impact of foreign military presence in Afghanistan. Their identities develop 
while attempting to encourage hegemonic visions in the uniform of a foreign military other. U.S. troops 
perceptions are heavily influenced by media, propaganda and discourse, yet the reflections on their own 
experiences often question and challenge the realities of relationships between Afghans and themselves, 
blurring the lines between liberation and occupation.   
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United States (U.S.) troops based in Afghanistan are witnessing their 
international military allies leave the country, nation by nation as the foreign led 
intervention Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which commenced in 2001, 
draws to a theoretic end (Alfsen, 2011, p.15). It has been the longest war the 
United States has fought, while Afghanistan has only experienced intermittent 
absences from the playbooks of both modern and ancient foreign militaries and 
imperialists (Kreisher, 2013; Bearden, 2001). The most recent intervention into 
Afghanistan placed U.S. troops alongside Afghan society, producing interactions 
and segmentation between U.S. service members and the population within the 
country known for this project as base-host relationships.  A societal split has 
taken place, as some Afghans have become part of the state apparatus invented 
by the international community after the 2001 invasion, such as the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) (Baron, 2013). Others are part of a political and 
combative opposition to foreign presence. Being comprised mostly of those loyal 
to the Taliban, the establishment that was ousted by the invasion, they are 
labeled insurgents by the U.S. and other foreign troops (Samples 2008).   The 
final group discussed is made up of Afghan civilians, who are portrayed as the 
basis and need for the conflict (Abu-Lughod 2002). Both sides of the fight, U.S. 
troops and insurgents, have tried to gain this groups’ allegiance while the conflict 
has consequently brought collateral damage to their communities (Bose 2013). 
U.S. troops experiences with and descriptions of these groups challenge and 
confirm the expectations for these interactions whether in opposition or defense 
of the U.S. led intervention. Today, the war continues and critics claim defeat on 
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a number of levels including governance and base host relationships.  Afghans 
are divided over identities of support, neutrality and opposition to the foreign 
militaries and insurgency that often change on a daily basis during this conflict. 
U.S. troops are tasked with attempting a mission with a fluid host often resulting 
in a major loss of blood and economic treasure. U.S. troops have also become 
confused over insurgent’s inability to submit to their presence while Afghan 
civilians and the Western formed Afghan government and security forces are 
both indifferent to, and participate with, (dis)loyalty to the hegemonic vision. The 
following vignette was offered by Golf, a participant in this study on the 
relationship between U.S. military members and Afghan society, demonstrating 
the tension within these players’ relationships.  
“We almost had a real serious incident…Afghans are very, very rough on all 
animals, dogs included. They don’t really value animals at all.” However, it was 
common for U.S. forces to adopt orphaned dogs in Afghanistan to live on base 
with them. On both deployments, Golf’s base had dogs that were raised up from 
abandoned puppies on garbage and MRE’s (Military issued food- Meals Ready 
to Eat). “We fed and raised them.” But he explained that all the dogs hated the 
Afghans and only trusted you if you were in a U.S. uniform.  The dogs would bark 
and growl at Afghan employees and military and he explained the Americans 
wouldn’t stop the dogs’ hostilities and thought it was instead funny. One 
interpreter was attacked by a dog that “took a good chunk out of him.” A Special 
Forces member came to the scene and sent the dog away. After the interpreter 
thanked the American for saving him from the dog, the soldier punched him, 
knocking the interpreter to the ground.  One evening the platoon was off base but 
the Afghans and dogs remained.  When the U.S. troops returned, they found one 
of their two dogs dead and the other with its paws cut off. “By the time someone 
rational got on the radio the platoon was back in the base and had the entire 
Afghan security force zip cuffed on their knees, ready to execute the entire thing.” 
They were eventually talked down from what Golf saw as being a potentially very 
bad situation, “over a dog.”  (Golf) 
 
This story perhaps reflects the wider imagination for what troops would like to 
achieve or perceive what they are able to achieve as a foreign military in 
Afghanistan if they rescue, feed and defend Afghanistan’s people. But this bond 
and loyalty is not formed through foreign intervention. It also is telling of what 
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happens to Afghans when they work alongside the U.S. or are perceived as 
favoring their presence.  One of the more troubling issues brought up in this 
experience demonstrated the tensions within the relationship between U.S. and 
Afghan troops.  Out of all the relationships amongst the groups, this one is seen 
as crucial to the hegemonic vision as these two groups are suppose to be 
working together in official cooperation. 
Gender was used to represent and define Afghanistan in order to define 
the geopolitical relationship that has taken place since the buildup to the war.  
These emotional portrayals attempted to offer an explanation to why the U.S. 
believed they were justified in the invasion and then stayed to state build 
alongside its allies.  This representation was used to highlight the differences 
between U.S. and Afghan society through an orientalist lens as well as portray 
the country as a gendered dichotomy a female victims and male villains. Afghan 
men were represented through depictions of the Taliban, holding them 
responsible and offered a rather limited scope of the complex male identities in 
Afghanistan who shaped the political process or gender policies in the country 
before and during the war.  Women were brought to the forefront of this portrayal 
and were defined, as victims who would only continue to be oppressed without 
Western intervention. Intervention and the subsequent state building were 
portrayed as a way to displace this report’s interpretation of gender oppression.  
Hegemonic and foreign interactions were supported by the notion that gender 
justice could be gained through war.  Interaction was purported to be a solution 
to this representation (Abu-Lughod, 2002). 
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These representations of gender fixated on the absence of women in the 
Afghan public sphere and equated this with oppression. Common conclusions 
include that they were invisible and inactive when in public because they wore 
burkas.  Some believed that foreign intervention would liberate these women to 
the point of removing their covers.  However many continued to wear them and 
this signified a complication in understanding the offered gender narrative in 
Afghanistan, revealing that the representations of gender were based on a 
limited context. As for the men, the narratives offered had failed to mention the 
identities and actions of Afghan men outside of the Taliban who aided foreign 
powers. Many of these men were responsible for brutality to women since before 
the war began and continue these methods today (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006, 
p. 115-116). However, this was a strategic ignorance as their assistance was 
essential for the military and state building efforts.  These alliances ignored 
women’s issues, instead marketing blame on women’s oppression on the enemy.  
Women’s lives in Afghanistan were packaged into a narrative that supported 
foreign and allied Afghan visions, still making women absent.  The intervention 
claimed this was a liberating act for women but in order to do so, they abused 
men deemed enemies.  When gender justice is focused on women, it overlooks 
gender-based violence against men and ignores gender as a category for proper 
treatment of people not just women.  In the case of the Afghan war, many of 
these men deemed enemies have been tortured and imprisoned without formal 
charges or rights as prisoners as they are considered terrorists, a category used 
to dehumanize those involved in political conflicts (Roth, 2004, p. 2-7; Puar and 
  Sarah Cosette  5 
 
 
Rai, 2002, p. 117-148). Institutional rights were granted to women through the 
state building process such as representation in the government and wider 
access to healthcare and education. Freedom gained is hard to measure.  First 
because the effects of war have a tremendous effect on women and deeper 
social practices; and security concerns have continued to limit their involvement 
in the public sphere. Second, their immense impact and involvement in the 
private sphere is overlooked and not always seen as valuable. Progress claimed 
by invasion or that women’s agony somehow ended with the fall of the Taliban is 
shortsighted and fulfilling to those who support the intervention.  With foreign 
presence in the country since the war it is difficult to predict how realistic these 
claims are of Afghan progress as they are inorganic and will inevitably change 
after foreign withdrawal. Hegemonic politics while claiming to elevate women's 
rights; actually avoids them or exploits them when making war (Barakat and 
Wardell, 2002). “As is often the case, the increased militarization of Afghan 
society made women more subject to violence than at any time before” 
(Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p. 345). 
Foreign troops representations of self and Afghan society are built through 
this interaction they have experienced as participants in the war. Experiences 
offer a limited scope of understanding gender and societal narratives although 
their representations are valuable in that they complicate and reaffirm the 
narratives describing this interaction and descriptions.  They have their own of 
interpretations of society and gender with descriptions built on their interactions 
with Afghan society as opposed to laying groundwork for justification of the war 
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as previous representations had offered. These are different representations of 
gender, power and community outside of the public representations. Most of the 
troops surveyed and interviewed experience a higher ratio of interactions with 
men.  A description of interaction or assistance to women was shown as indirect.  
This revealed that this attention to women’s issues was absent despite how it 
was marketed. These interactions affected how they characterized Afghans and 
ultimately affected their opinions, creating a cycle that would continue to affect 
their interactions with and memories of Afghan society. Troops’ representations 
of Afghans reveal orientalist descriptions and a variation of trying to understand 
the other through a lens of occupation. These descriptions explain how foreign 
presence is impacted by gender representations and vice versa through the 
interactions between foreign troops and Afghan society. It offers an expansion to 
how it is popularly imagined reported and represented.  
The war has placed these incongruent and unfamiliar communities 
working in conflict and cooperation together, while popular discourses 
surrounding these dealings have deployed gender as a tool to describe and 
suggest the expectations for interaction between them (Cloud, 2004). Two public 
discourses emerged under this military campaign; propaganda claiming 
liberation, meant to justify the incursion into Afghanistan and a counterinsurgency 
policy that asked U.S. troops to win Afghan’s hearts and minds (Exum 2011). 
These discourses portrayed Afghan society and U.S. troops via a gendered lens 
to oversimplify the contact, and ultimately the conflict and cooperation between 
these players, ignoring the complex gender dynamics, identities and histories of 
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Afghans and U.S. troops. These imagined descriptions placed the U.S. troops in 
a role describing them as a force of good guys attempting to heroically rescue 
and liberate Afghan society from a sovereign regime described as villainous bad 
guys. Afghan society was often reduced to a one-dimensional victim with visual 
descriptions and commentary focusing on the country’s burka covered female 
population to prove that supposition (Abu-Lughod, 2002). The society’s 
empowerment was then further seen as dependent on counterinsurgency 
policies, claiming that Afghan advancement and cooperation could be achieved 
based on how troops interacted with Afghan’s hearts and minds.  
To a certain extent the conversations and expectations are projected and 
discussed by outsiders and those in power. Whether it is amongst popular U.S. 
society or high ranking U.S. military commanders, they are outside of the sphere 
and general experience that U.S. troops have working (in)directly with Afghan 
society through base host relationships. This thesis argues that both foreign 
troops (U.S. and its allies) and Afghan people are part of a gendered 
representation in the discourse and have little access to the political process 
while being direct players, defying and embodying the rhetoric as well as serving 
as symbols and scapegoats of why progress is or is not made in the Afghan war. 
This argument was established through comparisons to similar historical patterns 
where foreign militaries attempted to develop nations based on their country’s 
perceptions and policies while convincing local populations they were occupying, 
colonized or invaded in order to support them (Spivak, 1988). U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan form identities as both the other and agents of a hegemonic 
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strategy. Narratives of their perceptions and experiences with Afghan society 
reflect a depiction that contradicts, challenges and reflects gender 
representations and expectations imagined by two popular discourses based on 
gendered and romanticized notions of war and occupation as liberation and 
counterinsurgency achievable through winning Afghan hearts and minds. U.S. 
military member’s experiences often relate a certain belief in the policy or popular 
discourse while revealing the belief that it is an uphill battle and possibly 
unachievable due to the fluid nature of their relationships and personal opinions 
about Afghan society. 
Through interviews and an online survey, veterans and active U.S. military 
offered their understanding of these dynamics against the gendered backdrop of 
liberation and the hearts and minds campaign. To secure anonymity, I replaced 
the names of the most active participants in this thesis with names from the 
military alphabet system, Alpha through Yankee and collectively refer to them as 
Alpha Yankee. 
Since troops are often talked about but have little access to the main 
discourse, their voice is crucial to better understanding the sociology of war. This 
thesis aims at describing their perceptions and experiences concerning their 
affect and interaction with Afghan communities and the Afghans effect on the 
troops and their roles and responsibilities.  U.S. military members serving abroad 
are in a unique historical position within the context of international relations.  
When developing the project, I wanted to speak with current military members 
and veterans of the Afghan War since 2001.  In order to understand these 
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equations better, I developed a fieldwork process to ascertain how U.S. troops 
characterized their presence and role within the war.  Through online surveys 
and different methods of interview, I was able to collect data that renegotiates the 
perceived gendered equations that designates U.S. troops as a foreign force in 
Afghanistan.   
Those that did participate in the surveys and interviews served in all years 
of the war until 2011 as well as every region within Afghanistan. There were 
forty-eight participants that completed the survey, with about fifteen of those 
deciding to participate in some form of the interview process as well.  Interviews 
were conducted in person, over the phone and through emails.  While mostly 
men participated, a few women also responded. The most dominant age range 
when serving in Afghanistan was 18-23, most of which were 24-29 at the time of 
the survey.  Each participant had different roles within the war and experiences 
with Afghan people and these interactions were reflected in their memory 
sometimes from experiences that occurred months or years earlier. 
Attitudes towards the study were both positive and negative. Many of the 
participants were excited to give their viewpoints on a part of the Afghan 
narrative that they felt rarely gets discussed or understood outside the 
propaganda and policy. Some of the troops questioned the motives of the study 
and were unsure of why many of the questions asked about Afghans and their 
society. Negative reactions ranged from unwillingness to respond citing national 
security to a fear this study would place unnecessary stress on troops with the 
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only goal being to further my career. In the end, those that did participate 
provided valuable insight into the ideas being discussed in this thesis.  
This thesis will contain five additional chapters that delve into the history, 
process and analysis of the gendered descriptions of these groups, public 
discourses and U.S. troop perceptions of the Afghan war. Following this 
introduction, a brief history will be given regarding Afghanistan and its current 
societal structures and conflicts, U.S. imperialism and discourse, as well as prior 
interactions these two nations have had that has played a role in the 
development of the topics being discussed. An analysis of relevant literature on 
liberation, counterinsurgency, and how gender roles were imagined and 
represented in this conflict, being discussed to provide readers context of prior 
work relevant to this study. A section stating my procedures for this study, 
including the survey and interview process, will also be provided. Once a 
background has been established, original research discovered through the 
surveys and interviews will be given and analyzed. This study breaks down the 
troop’s experiences into two chapters, liberation and counterinsurgency, in an 
effort to challenge U.S. policy and actions. As the thesis concludes, a final 
analysis will be given tying relevant historical facts, prior literature as well as 
current discourse and policies to that of troop’s experiences in the Afghan 
conflict. These connections will help add to the discussion of problems that arise 












2. Discourse, Roles and Relationships 
This study examines the relationships between U.S. troops, Afghan 
civilians, insurgents and state agents. Each of these groups plays an important 
role within the dynamics and relationships of the conflict. These base host 
relationships place U.S. troops as a foreign other in Afghanistan while wearing 
the military uniform of a global hegemonic power. This chapter offers literature 
that depicts and critiques the justification for this war as well as the policies and 
discourses formed to fulfill their goals. As this study identifies relationships and 
applies them to the discourses attempting to direct each group, it is important to 
understand their backgrounds. Both the propaganda describing liberation and 
counterinsurgency doctrine attempting to win hearts and minds built expectations 
around the relationships between Afghan society and U.S. troops.  These 
discourses used gender as a frame to describe the roles within these base host 
relationships. The notions of liberation and hearts and minds will be 
deconstructed within the Afghan theatre, both offering and critiquing them with 
literature that problematizes and maintains these concepts to provide a 
foundation for the narratives and perceptions of research participants.  
 
2.1 Justification for Intervention 
On September 11, 2001, hijackers overtook four civilian commercial flights 
and crashed them into the Pentagon in Virginia and the twin towers of the World 
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Trade Center in New York City. The subsequent deaths that took place from the 
building’s fires and collapse were etched and experienced not only by the 
eyewitnesses but those who experienced it through broadcasts around the world.  
It was a shock to America’s citizenry and quickly sent the public and government 
scrambling to respond to who was responsible for the attacks. Mullah Omar, the 
Taliban leader had his foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil issue a 
statement the day of the attacks on behalf of Omar saying "We denounce this 
terrorist attack, whoever is behind it” ("CNN").     However, despite the 
condolences and denial of any support in the attack, the U.S. discourse 
portrayed the Afghan nationalist regime to be synonymous and in close affiliation 
with al-Qaeda, an international terrorist network who ultimately took responsibility 
for the attack. Al-Qaeda operated through a global network, but their leader 
Osama bin Laden was based in Afghanistan. As events continued to unfold, the 
perpetrators and their actions began to be defined. David Frum, President 
George W. Bush’s speechwriter, described the U.S. administration’s take on the 
events:  
Within 48 hours, [Bush] had made the two key decisions that have defined the 
war on terror. First, this is a war, not a crime. And second, this war is not going to 
be limited to just the authors of the 9/11 attack but to anyone who assisted them 
and helped them and made their work possible, including states. And that is a 
dramatic, dramatic event. And that defines everything. (Kirk) 
 
While U.S. political discourse and media were sorting out their versions of 
who the perpetrators were to these acts of terror, they were also defining the 
roles and reasoning for invading Afghanistan. The United States further 
reinforced that they perceived the terrorist act as war and not a crime when they 
launched their response militarily and not judicially.  In the fall of 2001, George 
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Bush announced a Global War on Terror (GWOT), Afghanistan being the first 
campaign (Bush, 2001). On October 7th, 2001, combat operations began under 
the campaign Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). By November of that year the 
United States was establishing their first ground bases within Afghanistan (Brown 
2012). A series of victories early in the campaign led the United States to believe 
they had triumphed and that their liberation of Afghanistan was progressing as 
planned when they ousted the Taliban from power.  Bush had described GWOT 
as a “crusade,” making some suspect this was a wider war on Islam although this 
was officially denied and said to be a mistaken description (Bush, 2001).   
The United States pursued its goal in the invasion and political relationship 
thereafter with the assistance of the Northern Alliance, the Taliban's domestic 
rival, as well as a comprehensive commitment of logistical and combat support 
from the international community. The Northern Alliance while the underdog in 
Afghan de facto leaderships at the time, were actually remnants of the massive 
network of warlords and corruption that had wreaked havoc on the country prior 
to the Taliban’s vigilante movement and consequential takeover of Afghanistan 
(Conetta, 2012). Instead, a new government would be formed in Bonn, Germany, 
which would exclude the Taliban and put anti-Taliban warlords in positions of 
official and unofficial power. With the U.S. military taking root in the country, it 
was not always clear where this new government, lead by Hamid Karzai, would 
rank in the power structure of Afghanistan (Suhrke, 2007; Ferguson, 2007; Hehir, 
2007).  
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To understand the current relationship between U.S. troops and Afghan 
society it is important to understand that while the U.S. framed their launch on 
Afghanistan as where this global war on terror would take place, they were also 
entering and taking sides in a civil war in the country. While many reasons 
behind the war were geopolitical, they were portrayed as liberation and often on 
behalf of Afghan women. It is important to understand how gender and 
geopolitics related to one another within the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the U.S. 
government. For many Afghans, the Taliban was a new direction for the country 
and a much-needed response to the widespread turmoil of the Afghan/Soviet 
conflict in the 1980s and then civil war that proceeded when they came to power 
in the mid 1990’s. Over their tenure the Taliban were criticized for the strictness 
that that they asserted to form a more perfect union, free from the unrest and 
exploitation by Afghan warlords who had a far worse human rights track record 
and are a part of the current Afghan government leadership. Throughout their 
codes of conduct they were severe on curbing pedophilia, rape, kidnapping and 
the mutilation of women and rates of these occurrences steadily dropped 
(Rashid, 2001). Alas, their vigilante-gendered justice was not picked up by 
airwaves as much as their preventing women from leaving their homes, 
institutionalized veiling, including the head to toe burka garment and closing their 
schools. Schools, the Taliban said, were not to be closed permanently, but would 
rather be opened only when a new national curriculum was developed and the 
streets were safer.  The community support to standing up to the warlords 
became backlash when new formed boundaries proved unpopular (Rashid, 
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2001).  While these practices were fluid depending on the security and presence 
of Taliban armed forces in the area, they were publicly associated with misogyny 
and extremism.  Often, they were frustrated by ignorance to their reasoning and 
claimed outsiders needed to improve their understanding of Afghanistan; they 
believed their actions revered women and were quite the opposite (Murphy, 
2010). The Taliban’s noted victories included the overwhelming total reduction in 
drug cultivation and trade as well as cutting down on weapons stockpiling by 
civilians (Rashid, 2001). 
Concurrently, Osama Bin Laden, after being expelled from Saudi Arabia 
and African countries took refuge in Afghanistan. As the leader of al-Qaeda, his 
U.S. opposition network attacked U.S. diplomatic and military installations 
overseas prior to 9/11 in reaction to U.S. military efforts and bases in the Middle 
East and their support in the creation of Israel.  Bin Laden had relocated his 
network to Afghanistan before the Taliban came to power.  He had previously 
fought alongside the mujahedeen in the Soviet/Afghan conflict and was 
welcomed and hosted by an Afghan warlord. Under the honor code of 
Pashtunwali, Pashtun Afghans honor relied on concepts of hospitality, 
forgiveness, sanctuary and revenge (Coll, 2001).  The Taliban came across Bin 
Laden in their country as they came to power, and accepted that he was to 
remain a protected guest under Pashtunwali until the international governments 
who he had terrorized were able to submit proof and would grant a fair Islamic 
trial.  They considered Osama Bin Laden an issue that they inherited instead of 
encouraging his presence as commonly portrayed. They believed that the 
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amount of attention the United States gave him only fanned the flames of his 
popularity and encouraged his group Al Qaeda (Stanglin, 2013).  Some analysts 
critique the Taliban for what they describe as harboring terrorist networks and 
leaders.  Some attribute much of the problem to the fact that the United States 
did not give the Afghan government fair opportunities or listen to requests that 
would've been granted to other international states. 
The Taliban would cease to be described as a government ruling over 
Afghanistan but rather part of an opposing masculinity to the United States, 
grouped together with Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, and other terrorists groups 
that would form the Afghan opposition after the 9/11 attacks. This collection of 
ideals, cultures and goals no matter how different would now be linked as one of 
terrorism in the eyes of the United States government (Bush 2001).  
While Afghanistan was heavily represented through female victimhood, 
the portrayal of Afghan men is equally important, and needs to be deconstructed. 
The villainization of men through the descriptions offered about the Taliban 
seemed to package the woes of the country and conveniently placed 
responsibility with the group.  This was accomplished through a rendering that 
described the group and the United States soon-to-be enemy in war as men 
having anachronistic masculinities and medieval policies and sourced this with 
their interpretation of Islam.  This served to discount Afghanistan’s complicated 
political history, dehumanizing them as the source of any backwards qualities 
that came to symbolize the country and validate the reason for intervention. “The 
Taliban in many ways have become a potent symbol of all that liberal public 
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opinion regards as grievously wrong with Islamic societies these days, proof of 
the intense misogyny long ascribed to Islam, and most emphatically to those 
movements within Islam referred to as fundamentalist.” (Hirschkind and 
Mahmood, 2002, p. 342)  By showing them as anachronistic and fundamentalists 
these discourses developed a strong sensibility they could be rejected by those 
that considered themselves modern and advance.  Misogyny was shown as 
synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism, and an explanation of the group’s 
gender policies were combined with a convenient dishonesty to source the 
country’s poverty and strife on the shoulders of the regime. “From the rubble left 
behind by the game of super power politics played out on Afghan bodies and 
communities, we can only identify the misogynist machinations of the Islamic 
fundamentalist that testifies to the power this image bears, and the force it exerts 
on our political imagination” (Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p. 342).  As the 
authors also state, these representations of men also provide a scapegoat that is 
able to overlook the actions of both US and Afghan society outside of this group 
who have significantly contributed to harm against Afghanistan’s women 
(Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p. 341). “The male protector confronts evil 
aggressors in the name of the right and the good, while those under his 
protection submit to his order and serve as handmaids to his efforts” (Young, 
2003, p. 17). In making war plans the U.S. was strategic in building Afghan 
alliances in order to invade and intervene. Pashtunwali, the ethnic majority’s 
code of conduct, was refuted when the U.S. cast this ideology out when refusing 
to engage in the Bin Laden negotiations after 9/11, using it as way to understand 
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why Bin Laden had refuge in Afghanistan as well as how to prosecute him and 
avoid a massive war.  This code was dismissed and instead grouped as part of 
the representation that suggested an orientalist, villainous and archaic 
masculinity was solely responsible for troubles in Afghanistan.  Pashtunwali and 
a focus on tribal allegiances, while given limited respect by leaders and teachers 
in culture awareness training, was commonly thought of as the most successful 
allegiance and had an incredible importance in how troops witnessed and 
participated in base host relationships. (Ross, 2010, p. 25) 
To gain support for the war and to use as justification for their actions, the 
United States government and media described the global war on terror by 
claiming anyone who fit their idea of a terrorist would be in the crosshairs. The 
Taliban’s dismissal and the refusal of the U.S. to negotiate with them as a 
legitimate Afghan government with a voice was further reinforced when 
described by popular discourse. Through portraying Afghan society as a 
dichotomy of villain and victim, the war was framed through a propaganda 
claiming liberation as the opposite of terrorism. This would further reinforce 
justification for intervention and a need for a heroic force to liberate Afghan 
society from terrorists. Upon the invasion, American troops were portrayed by 
popular discourse as rescuers of victims who could displace the villainized power 
with a courageous power committed to the country’s freedom, defense and 
progress. U.S. troops actions were portrayed as benevolent and a shared global 
need of both the U.S. and Afghans to fight and defend against oppression and 
terror. 
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In placing GWOT in Afghanistan, it justified militarily occupying the country 
even though Afghans were never part of the terrorism the hegemony was 
supposedly fighting against.  Instead, these discourses claimed that the liberation 
of Afghanistan was attainable through fighting terrorism and state development.  
They ignored the complex identities and histories of Afghans and instead, 
simplified their portrayal of the Afghans to that of a masculine villain and feminine 
victim.  Any opposition to the U.S. in Afghanistan was rendered as terrorism and, 
over the course of the intervention, was considered insurgency trying to diminish 
liberation efforts. 
 
2.2 Building Policy around Women in their Absence 
Afghan women and their struggles with the Taliban had been a platform of 
women’s rights activists such as the Feminist Majority Campaign and 
Revolutionary Afghan Women’s Association (RAWA, 2001), calling for an end to 
their oppression in the years before the invasion (RAWA, "About RAWA", 2001).  
This platform was then used and modified as propaganda for the U.S. invasion in 
2001 that claimed in many ways to be on behalf of women. Both official rhetoric 
and popular media displayed these women to symbolize an emasculated Afghan 
society. The Taliban was symbolized as the source of the oppression and 
therefore villainized as the victimizer by public discourse.  
Laura Bush, the wife of then U.S. President George W. Bush, addressed 
the nation as part of this liberation propaganda a month after the invasion.  She 
opened by describing the Taliban and Al Qaeda as a misogynistic masculinity 
  Sarah Cosette  20 
 
 
with words like brutality, control, forbid, cruelty as responsible for the suffering of 
Afghan women and children. She continued to reinforce the idea that Afghan 
society was a dichotomy of a feminized and infantilized victim and an oppressive 
terrorist masculinity. She claimed that because of U.S. military efforts, women 
and children were now “rejoicing” as they experienced freedoms such as 
listening to music and learning.  
Civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror, not only 
because our hearts break for the women and children in Afghanistan but also 
because, in Afghanistan, we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on 
the rest of us. ("Radio Address by Mrs. Bush")  
 
These ideas helped construct the description of the U.S. military as part of 
the civilized response to the unwelcome Afghan masculinity.  It also symbolized 
them as a necessary protective buffer to prevent the global spread of this 
oppressive masculinity. She claimed that the oppression of women was a central 
goal of terrorists and asked for support in the U.S. efforts, suggesting their 
intervention work was to “ensure that dignity and opportunity would be secured 
for all Afghan women and children.” Historically, in most cultures women have 
been lumped together with children, considered incapable of the “decisiveness” 
required to conduct international politics (Kumar and Stabile, 2005). It should be 
noted that in addition to the continued propaganda featuring Afghan women 
throughout the war, the former first lady has continued to speak on behalf of 
Afghan women and children plights as part of this platform. 
Cynthia Enloe, an influential feminist theorist, describes the intersection of 
hegemonic military practices and gender:  
When it’s a patriarchal world that is ‘dangerous’, masculine men and feminine 
women are expected to react in opposite but complimentary ways. A ‘real man’ 
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will become the protector in such a world. He will suppress his own fears, brace 
himself and step forward to defend the weak, women and children. In the same 
‘dangerous world’ women will turn gratefully and expectantly to their fathers and 
husbands, real or surrogate. If a woman is a mother, then she will think of her 
children, protecting them not in a manly way, but as a self-sacrificing mother. 
(Militarization, 12-13)   
 
Assuming that Afghans wanted to be liberated and welcome such a force, the 
U.S. military invaded the country.  This base host relationship study reveals that 
U.S. troops are confounded by not being welcome as Afghans as liberators.  
In their article, “Unveiling Imperialism: Media, Gender and the War on 
Afghanistan”, Carole Stabile and Deepa Kumar discuss how gender and media 
were used as tools within the liberation propaganda.  
The central framework employed to justify the US war was thoroughly Orientalist; 
it constructed the West as the beacon of civilization with an obligation to tame the 
Islamic world and liberate its women. (Kumar and Stabile, 2005, p.766) 
 
They hoped the image of Afghan women in burkas that inundated mainstream 
media would bring attention to those who had worked on Afghan women’s rights 
during the Taliban’s tenure.  However, in these authors’ opinions, women were 
merely objectified in order to construct justification for invading Afghanistan and 
did not better their plights. In addition, this demonstrates that when media over 
emphasizes women as an object for which to define a foreign society it further 
obscures hegemonic state building goals and makes empty commitments related 
to women’s rights.    
The foundational text about gender and the propaganda of women’s 
liberation in Afghanistan is Lila Abu Lughod’s 2002 article, “Do Muslim Women 
Really Need Saving?” She complicates the propaganda and its tendency to 
portray this war through static gendered descriptions of Muslim women.  She 
argues:  
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We need to be suspicious when neat cultural icons are plastered over messier 
historical and political narratives, so we need to be wary when Lord Cromer in 
British-ruled Egypt, French ladies in Algeria, and Laura Bush, all with military 
troops behind them, claim to be saving or liberating Muslim women.  (785) 
 
She explains that the hegemonic powers have used foreign militaries in past 
colonial projects and the present Global War on Terror to respond to their 
differences in gender and culture while having a fairly small scope for which to 
understand those contexts. In Afghanistan, she describes how the burka became 
an icon in this war while propaganda reduced the form of veiling or “covering,” to 
describe part of the Taliban’s oppression.  However, she questions the idea that 
propagandists believed women would take off the burka during this liberation 
when for so many Afghan women it is part of how they portray femininity and 
negotiate access in the public space.  Abu Lughod doesn’t dismiss the overthrow 
of the Taliban but does believe women’s voices and cultural contexts have not 
been used in redefining and rebuilding Afghanistan since the invasion.  Western 
tendencies to build folklore based on their own imaginations of cultural difference 
about the men they are fighting and the women they are liberating has only 
reinforced characterizations of the other and supported imperialism.  
Stabile and Kumar say that the Afghan liberation propaganda combined a 
narrative with Orientalism to justify the foreign military presence and imperial 
aggression.  
According to the logic of the protection scenario, women, like the penetrable, 
feminized territory of the nation-state, must be protected from the predatory 
advances of some real or imaginary enemy. (Kumar and Stabile, 2005, p. 770) 
 
Through describing the country in need of protection as victimized and the 
Taliban regime inadequate of the country’s control as a villain, it created an 
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imagined space for a liberator. Stabile and Kumar support Enloe’s argument that 
“gendered roles are created to maintain a hierarchy that keeps certain elite men 
at the top, often at the expense of women, children and non-elite men” (Enloe, 
2001b). Popular discourse, “treat women as objects – of official policies, of 
cultural or of traditional practices – without acknowledging women’s reactions or 
contributions to new laws, historic events or daily life.” While women are used as 
objects to sell war, they are ignored in the actual policy making process. “The 
national political arena is a sphere for men only, for those rare women who can 
successfully play at being men, or at least not shake masculine presumptions” 
(Enloe, 2001). 
Enloe discusses how foreign militaries reveal complicated sexual politics.  
She says that historically militaries institutionalized prostitution to improve 
morale, prevent local women from being raped and to control the spread of 
venereal diseases.  In GWOT, prostitution has been unofficial as the U.S. military 
prohibits its practice as not to offend local communities (Enloe, 2001).  However, 
as women have been marketed to justify this war, they have been victims while 
being portrayed as the site of rescue. While Afghan women are being claimed as 
respected and protected by the U.S. military, their own female and male 
comrades are being sexually assaulted at alarming rates by their fellow military 
members.  Women’s inclusion in the U.S. military has been also marketed as 
liberation, although it has been manipulated. A common argument is whether 
women should be included in combat roles as a means to equality.  In 2013, the 
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DOD announced women would be allowed to apply for these roles, with many 
advocates claiming this as a milestone of progress for women (Hawkins, 2013).  
Enloe reiterates this point saying that those in military leadership have 
“tried to camouflage women’s service to the military as women’s liberation” 
(Enloe, 1983). This “camouflage” has distracted the public from the effects of the 
foreign intervention in Afghanistan and built false notions that foreign militaries 
and occupied societies are supposed to work in unison towards a common goal 
of liberation. Shallow gendered descriptions of the country as feminine have 
further subjugated its society’s vast identities and needs. “This negation of 
“femininity” arises from the military’s masculine self definition. One of the 
bastions of masculinity in a sexist society, the military constructs male identity as 
being predicated on violence and combat. This stands in contrast to the notion of 
women as passive, away from the battlefront. However, women are not away 
from the battlefront and their lives are deeply affected outside of the liberation 
discourse. Victoria Brittain says, in the introduction of her book, Shadow Lives:  
Afghanistan has been devastated for its own people many times over, but most 
of all in the most ideological and technological of wars…it was a war based on a 
convenient myth of Afghan responsibility for 9/11.  The real Afghanistan of the 
shepherd boys, village wedding parties, grandmothers and babies, killed by US 
bombs was visible and dehumanized in a decade of its people being used for 
deadly experiments in enforcing Western power. (Brittain, 2013, p. 2)  
 
These literatures show that liberation is a propaganda code word used to justify 
entrance into a sovereign society.  Women are merely falsely marketed and their 
gender repackaged to further hegemonic goals as they continue to be ignored by 
power structures. The actual impact of foreign militaries in base host 
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relationships is obscured by this discourse and false definition and example of 
liberation.  
Some communities pay the highest price: their farmland taken for bases, their 
children neurologically damages by military jet fuel in their water supplies, their 
neighbors imprisoned, tortured and disappeared… (Lutz, 2009, p. 4)  
 
These are the actual effects of occupation that complicate the idea that foreign 
militaries and hegemonic visions bring liberation through their efforts.   
Afghans mounting tensions to Operation Enduring Freedom and the newly 
formed Afghan government as well as the GWOT’s attention shifting to Iraq, 
supported a rise in insurgency, most notable those affiliated with the Taliban. The 
U.S. eventually transitioned to changing their methods into counterinsurgency as 
liberation, which proved elusive.  The Afghans had been placed in a stagnant, 
gendered description and dragged into this fight that by a portrayal that a foreign 
force could liberate them from terrorism. When this notion did not take root, the 
counterinsurgency policy claimed that their empowerment was the goal and not 
pacification as these doctrines had been described during colonialism.  Just as 
the propaganda of liberation was portrayed as being on behalf of women, this 
counterinsurgency plan claimed to be on behalf of Afghan civilians to foster a 
better cooperation and relationship between them, foreign militaries and the 
Afghan state and militaries, ridding the country of insurgents (Jones, 2009).   
 
2.3 Finding a Place with Liberation and Counterinsurgency 
Although the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions were both targeted during 
the GWOT, they have unique histories and qualities making it at times helpful to 
link them, while other times detrimental due to the tendency to symbolize them 
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together.  In both arenas, a recycled policy was spun through both the military 
and media that in order for the United States and its allies to triumph in the 
GWOT, the hearts and minds of locals would be the described goal. Once it was 
clear the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies would be 
staying longer than planned, a new approach needed to be established to 
respond to the insurgency. “America arguably intended its forces to occupy 
briefly, transform local politics in Wilsonian fashion, and then depart” (Calder, 
2007). 
 General Sir Gerald Templer coined the term to describe Britain’s 
apparently successful counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya (1948-60). He 
stated, “The answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more troops into the 
jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people” (Dixon, 2009). In military 
terminology it is better understood as counterinsurgency doctrine. Laileh Khalil 
defines counterinsurgency as asymmetrical warfare by a powerful military against 
irregular combatants supported by a civilian population. Troops were encouraged 
to take a softer approach to encountering civilians in Afghanistan in order to gain 
support for their mission. They were told that although this may result in the loss 
of more American life initially, the long term effect would be overall progress and 
gains in the fight against insurgents and Taliban fighters (“The New and Old” 14-
23).  This “battle” also made for better public relations as citizens from the U.S. 
and from the allied nations were showing frustration at the progress.  This 
counterinsurgency method was founded in research and had been unsuccessful 
for past militaries fighting insurgencies globally.  As an overall understanding, 
  Sarah Cosette  27 
 
 
wars of counterinsurgency cannot likely be won by foreign armies.  However, top 
military officials and social scientists encouraged the softer approach and 
expected their service members to embrace its style (Petraeus and Amos,2006). 
Commanders have disagreed that the method should be used and troops resent 
it citing the confusion on whether the priority is on U.S., Afghan or human life 
(Boal, 2011). This concern is compounded by their fellow service members’ 
deaths, perceived as a direct result in the change in policy and the frustration and 
exhaustion from the thirteen-year war. The need to be more respectful to a 
country that was villianized and emasculated to them in the first place additionally 
makes soldiers skeptical. 
The war in Afghanistan from the position of foreign troops is fought 
through counterinsurgency.  In this situation, foreign troops are not fighting a 
traditional military but against insurgents from the local populace.  In Afghanistan, 
insurgents are comprised of Taliban fighters; civilian members and most recently, 
allied Afghan security forces.  Their reason for insubordination to the international 
direction and presence ranges significantly.  Counterinsurgency aims to reduce 
insurgency and gain the support of the local population pursuing goals for the 
reconstruction and future of Afghanistan designed by global leaders and 
alliances (Petraeus and Amos, 2006).  Semantically supportive of the foreign 
mission is the “Battle to Win the Hearts and Minds of the Afghan People.” 
General David Petraeus, of the U.S. Army, honed in and promoted this policy in 
his modern take on the United States’ counterinsurgency operations in the U.S. 
Army Field Manual FM-324.  This publication, written in 2006, is seen as the 
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seminal literature and a new way forward in current and future conflicts with 
insurgents.  Its objectives are to demonstrate to military members engaged in this 
conflict how to steer the population’s support of foreign presence and goals away 
from those who are attempting to overthrow foreign presence. Neither insurgents 
nor counterinsurgents can “win” without the support of the population and that is 
where victories are won according to this theory.  This theory also creates a 
trilateral equation of competing for indigenous support.  This can be achieved, 
supposedly, through lower impact fighting.  While the initial loss of foreign military 
life is expected initially, support eventually will favor the outsider and what they 
have to offer the society. 
Nagl, an important voice in modern military that contributed to FM-324, 
says this about the report:  
The doctrinal manual was built around two big ideas: first, that protecting the 
population was the key to success in any counterinsurgency campaign, and 
second, that to succeed in counterinsurgency, an army has to be able to learn 
and adapt more rapidly than its enemies. (Nagl, 2012) 
 
David Galula, a historical military author of French citizenry, was born in Tunisia 
and raised in Casablanca. FM-324 was built on his understanding of 
counterinsurgency known for such publications like the 1950s, “Pacification of 
Algeria,” for the RAND Corporation. He introduces his influential report, “Counter-
insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” by saying the following about war,  
“War is not a chess game but a vast social phenomenon with an infinitely greater 
and ever expanding number of variables, some of which elude analysis.” (Galula, 
1964, p. 9) When discussing the division in a society between insurgents and 
civilians, he notes:  
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The population represents this new ground. If the insurgent manages to 
dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get 
its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise 
of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, 
at worst, on its submissiveness. (Galula, 1964, pg. 6) 
 
Kilcullen, a modern influential theorist and former Australian military member, 
applies the counterinsurgency as reflected in conflicts in the Middle East and 
Central Asia.  
Politically, in many cases today, the counterinsurgent represents revolutionary 
change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned 
spaces, or to repel an occupier — a political relationship opposite to that 
envisaged in classical counterinsurgency. Pakistan’s campaign in Waziristan 
since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes Al-Qa’ida (AQ) linked extremists 
and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture 
against 21st century encroachment. The problem of weaning these fighters away 
from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernization, does 
somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counterinsurgency. But it also 
echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the 
effects of globalization. (Kilcullen, 2010; p. 3) 
 
In responding to Kilcullen’s reading of the hearts and minds concept, 
scholar Laleh Khalili says:  
This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises two 
separate components.  “Hearts,” means persuading people their best interest are 
served by your success. “Minds” means convincing them that you can protect 
them and that resisting you is pointless.  Note that neither has to do with whether 
people like you.  Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. (“The New 
and Old” 15)  
 
She says that counterinsurgency is practiced through a gendered dichotomy of 
the civilian as feminine and the combatant or insurgent as masculine.  Also, 
counterinsurgency is perceived by those in support and defiance of it as a 
feminine and civilized approach to the more destructive masculine approach.  
The binary categorization which forms the basis of mainstream discourses about 
war, civilian (feminine) is the opposite of combatant (masculine). Moreover, we 
know that the discursive practices surrounding war also reproduce extant 
gendered hierarchies through the constant reproduction of a dichotomous 
rhetoric of masculinities and femininities. (“The New and Old” 17) 
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However, as the liberation propaganda showed us, the tendency to dichotomize 
gender in hearts and minds as well explains that it continues to be the tool of 
war, further reinforcing designations as understood by outsiders while ignoring 
the complexities of society in Afghanistan. She goes on to explain: 
A more complicated set of gendering practices occurs not at the endpoint of 
application of counterinsurgency force, but at the seam of encounter between the 
occupying military forces and the people subjected to counterinsurgency. This 
seam is the messy interstitial space in which the cross-hatching of race, gender, 
class, and empire all produce unexpected hierarchical positioning. (“Gendered 
Practices” 11) 
 
The analytical chapters (4 and 5) will illustrate the U.S. troops 
perspectives were challenged and maintained these discourses of liberation and 
counterinsurgency.  Their experiences on the ground did not always reflect what 
those in power had asked them to accomplish.  While they were at the bottom of 
the U.S. military hierarchy, they were placed at the top of a power hierarchy of 
foreign troops based in Afghan society acting out the hegemonic mission.  
However, they saw their presence challenged and had trouble accepting why 
liberation was unwelcomed by so many.  Their preceding descriptions of these 
relationships show how conditions and confusions within these affiliations are far 
outside the discourses of liberation and hearts and minds. 
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3. Methodology  
Outsiders have portrayed Afghanistan in discourse and doctrine as a war 
that was described and built, won or lost through the relationships between U.S. 
troops and Afghan society. United States military members serving abroad are in 
a unique historical position within the context of international relations. I felt it was 
a natural progression to explore this relationship from U.S. sources that 
experienced it firsthand, albeit a limited scope until Afghan perspectives are 
attained, to better understand the sociology of war. When developing the project, 
I wanted to speak with active military members and veterans of the Afghan War. 
My research site was in the United States, the troops’ home base away from the 
Afghan arena from 2011 until 2012. This chapter will explain the methodological 
processes involved in this research including its development, implementation, 
response and analysis. The survey questions used will be provided followed by 
how interviewees were chosen and what questions they would be asked. This 
section will also look into who took the survey as well as reasoning for resistance 
to the questioning by others.  
As the surveys and interviews were being conducted, the situation in 
Afghanistan was constantly changing. Headlines in the media were updating the 
public and the troops back in the United States as to the progress of the war. 
Just before my interview with Alpha, General McChrystal had been dismissed for 
his comments in Rolling Stone magazine about President Barrack Obama and 
the military efforts in Afghanistan (Wilson and Shear). Many of the interviewees 
spoke of their dissatisfaction when asked about the media’s coverage and 
  Sarah Cosette  32 
 
 
portrayal of troops. “I was sick and tired of hearing media reports that seemed 
inaccurate, that were not the full story. I want to go and have my own story, my 
own story to tell my family,” stated Bravo.  The troops who took the survey, and 
for those that participated in the interviews, each had a chance to tell their own 
stories. Their perspectives could be recorded on a variety of topics without 
outside influence or censorship providing a unique glimpse from one side of the 
Afghan conflict. These insights into the minds of the troops on the ground are 
important when explaining the actions and intentions of a group that usually has 
no voice other than ones given to them by their government and media.  
It should be remembered that these reflections are given by men and 
women based on their memories when in their home country after there is space 
and time between them and Afghanistan.  Some of them would return in the 
future while others would not, either because they had retired or would be based 
in another country, part of the U.S. base expanse.  When asked what was a 
major concern that needed to be addressed in the current lives of U.S. troops 
and veterans, an overwhelming amount brought up post-traumatic stress 
disorder and said that many of them suffered it.  PTSD, as it is commonly 
referred to, is defined by the Mayo Clinic online as:  “. . . a mental health 
condition that's triggered by a terrifying event. Symptoms may include 
flashbacks, nightmares and severe anxiety, as well as uncontrollable thoughts 
about the event”  (MayoClinic.com).  The highest risk factor for men is combat 
exposure, and this health concern has also been used to represent U.S. military 
members in the public discourse.  However just as gender was repackaged to fit 
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a narrative of support for Operation Enduring Freedom, this issue has been used 
to stereotype troops offering little context and reduces them to crazy or 
dangerous.  This discourages troops from seeking treatment for fear of being 
stigmatized by a description that some may perceive as a weakness. If the 
effects of war include PTSD for U.S. troops, then it surely there is also a feature 
in Afghan society, given that Afghans have experienced wars for generations. 
However, it is considered a western construct that is primarily discussed as it 
pertains to troops and is void of including and discussing the health of the other 
half of this base host relationship, the individuals and communities of nations in 
conflict with the US who are also deeply affected by war.   
 
3.1 The Survey 
Base host politics, as they are called within international relations and 
political science literatures, are complex relationships between a foreign military, 
such as the U.S. and the national society where they are stationed or hosted 
(Cooley, 2008, p. 18). This foreign presence and the relationship that results vary 
based on numerous factors including the association and agreement between 
the two or more governments involved, regions, cultures and whether or not they 
are involved in a war.  Nonprobability sampling techniques were utilized to 
identify the study group. Expert sampling was used to provide viewpoints from 
those with actual experience with the subject matter. While viewpoints from the 
general public and non-troop groups may have provided some information on the 
subject, the most effective way to extract data was to go directly to the source. 
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The troops surveyed would have firsthand knowledge of the situations being 
questioned. Snowball sampling was also used when expanding survey and 
interview participation. Contacts such as university liaisons for active and veteran 
troops would refer me to other groups that might be interested in the study. 
Troops were commonly in contact with other service members that they had 
served with in Afghanistan. These connections would prove to be a good way of 
spreading the survey to ideal candidates. The survey provided in Appendix A and 
the interview questions in Appendix B were developed to offer United States 
service members the opportunity to discuss their experiences in Afghanistan as 
members of a foreign military in Afghan society. 
I offered the survey online through the site Survey Monkey.  This was an 
effective tool and made sharing it incredibly convenient.  The first portion of the 
survey was created in order to gain background knowledge of the troops being 
surveyed. Demographic information could then be used to identify patterns 
between different groups within the survey information (i.e. gender, location 
within Afghanistan, branch of military). General information about the types and 
frequency of activities between troops and Afghans would also lay the 
groundwork for this study by providing a glimpse into troop activities not typically 
covered by outside sources.  
The section, “Base Host Relationships & Civilian Support” was designed 
to allow the troops to describe their viewpoints on a variety of topics regarding 
U.S. discourses on Afghanistan. These viewpoints can then be compared to U.S. 
policy and preconceived notions about Afghan civilians and society.  Questions 
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about positive and negative actions are presented in order to gain an 
understanding of problems that arise within the U.S. troop/Afghan relationships. 
This will begin to paint a picture of what issues can arise from a foreign military 
presence within a community. Soldiers’ opinions on trust are questioned to gain 
knowledge of where they feel allegiances lie. These answers can be used to 
show how a foreign military’s presence can alter societal relations, goals and 
roles within daily lives of a particular community.  
The next section of the survey offers questions about the troop’s 
education and training before and while they were in Afghanistan. These 
questions were proposed to gauge what knowledge troops had in terms of 
Afghan society and culture. This would provide a basis when analyzing their 
actions with different portions of the Afghan society. It would also provide insight 
into difficulties the U.S. troops might have in their interactions with civilians on a 
daily basis. This information would be crucial in identifying how two different 
cultures interact with each other, especially within the stressful circumstances 
provided within a military setting.  
A section of questions were provided for the troops to give insight to their 
roles within the Afghan conflict.  Rhetoric of liberation was used to mimic the U.S. 
discourse of Operation Enduring Freedom (Brown, 2012). Questions were used 
to determine if troops identified with this description or if they felt other 
terminology towards their actions and roles were more appropriate. Troops were 
also asked to describe their views and interactions with Afghan men, women and 
youth. These questions were designed for the troops to counter their descriptions 
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of their own roles with viewpoints of those they would be forced to interact with. 
These questions were strategically placed in this section to illicit a response 
about Afghan society while troops were contemplating their own roles within this 
foreign society.  
The section of the survey entitled “U.S. Forces Purpose and 
Responsibility” was designed to get the troops to contemplate what purpose their 
deployment to Afghanistan served. It was hoped that troops would go behind 
standard talking points found within typical U.S. government and media talking 
points, as well as question if their presence was even needed. Questions 
regarding what effects their presence had on Afghanistan were open ended as to 
not direct their responses in any particular direction. Answers to many of these 
questions would elicit a wide variety of responses, having many of them question 
the overall motives behind their presence in the country.  
 
3.2 Interviews 
At the end of the survey, respondents were asked to provide contact 
information if they wished to be contacted for personal interviews. The idea 
behind the interviews were to provide troops the opportunity to add to their 
responses or provide new information they felt was important that may not have 
been covered by the survey. I conducted personal interviews with available 
surveyed participants in the spring of 2011. Interviews conducted after this 
season were acquired via phone and the Internet.  Questions were formed on a 
case-by-case basis for each person surveyed. If interesting points were made 
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within their survey or if there were any items that needed more clarification, they 
would be focused on first. I would then give the interviewee the opportunity to 
expand on any subject of their interest. Interviews were conducted in person, 
over the phone and through emails.   
There were a few participants who could not be met in person due to 
scheduling conflicts or geographical distance. These participants would be 
provided an email interview that mirrored the interviews with other respondents, 
asking for clarification or expansion on survey topics and allowing for the 
respondent to speak to any issue that was not directly asked to them. The email 
interviews were quite effective, given the length of participants’ responses.  They 
reflected a great range of attitudes and experiences.  To try and expand on the 
perceptions of the participants about the nuances of this relationship, I ended my 
interviews with a creative exercise. The emails were closed with the following 
questions being posed:  
If you were to be the host of one Afghan person for tea, who would it be? Use 
your imagination.  I want you to describe to me the who, what, why, when, where, 
and how of this encounter.  Imagine you are unrestricted by language.  No 
translator needed. How would you dress? How would they? Describe this person 
for me. You could have met this person or they could be based on your 
knowledge or perception of Afghans. It could be an average citizen or public 
figure, whoever you personally, if given the chance, would want to talk to. They 
could be in any group whether devout to opposition, corruption, civil or civilian 
life? Man or woman, you have the opportunity to communicate freely with this 
person. What American and Afghan cultural norms would you include? What 
would you talk about? What would you say about your time in Afghanistan and 
interpretation of their culture? Would weapons be present? How would you sit? 
Describe the scenario and your related emotions. 
 
This exercise was designed to both add to the data collected in the 
interviews and surveys, as well as provide insight into areas I had not previously 
imagined. While only a few responded, it concludes the data collection with a 
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3.3 Participation and Resistance 
My goal was to survey and interview both veterans and active military 
members about their experiences with Afghan civilians since 2001. Each of the 
participants spoke of their specific time in Afghanistan, within different parts of 
the country, different times in their personal lives and different times in the 
discourses. This wide range of views told of experiences across many aspects of 
Afghan life and military service. Some troops had years to process their time in 
Afghanistan and form their opinions. Others had only been back from active duty 
for a few months, emotions still fresh in their minds. This range of self-reflection 
provided a well-rounded set of responses and emotions that could be used 
throughout this thesis.  
I designed the online survey and shared it with liaisons of various 
organizations that serve and connect the military and veteran communities.  
These liaisons would review the survey individually or with their staff and then 
make a decision whether they wanted to share it with their members who have 
served in the U.S. military in Afghanistan.  If they decided they would like to 
participate, I then sent them a link to be sent to their members via whatever 
process they thought would be best. I also took the opportunity to meet in person 
with liaisons directly when I was in their city in order to discuss my goals, project 
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and the subject matter. Due to the sensitivity of the research subject matter, it 
was especially important to meet with people in person when possible.  The 
opportunity to meet face to face helped with people’s caution about participating 
and also helped develop a rapport.    
I proposed the project to multiple groups with the potential of reaching 
thousands of soldiers and veterans.  After leaving the survey open to responses 
from the fall of 2010 to the spring of 2012, approximately fifty participants in all 
participated in the survey; about a quarter decided to participate in interviews.  
The reaction was incredibly varied and as I proceeded to communicate further 
with the participants and liaisons they shared their thoughts on the project. There 
were those that who were immediately comfortable with the project and promptly 
shared it with their members. Some of these liaisons and participants shared that 
they felt it was an important subject and one that needed further investigation.  
They acknowledged that relationships between U.S. soldiers and Afghan civilians 
were incredible complex and further comprehension was needed to be beneficial 
for both parties involved.  Many commented that media and academia often 
overlooked it and it was an essential component of the conflict.  Many 
participants stated a general distrust of media and their slanted portrayals of 
soldiers’ identities and roles in wartime. 
However, other groups were offended at the project’s concept and subject.   
Responses ranged from claims that the questions in the survey jeopardized 
American national security or that they felt like an interrogation.  Some claimed it 
was too soon for soldiers to be talking about the subject and their experiences.  
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Some felt it would be difficult for soldiers to recount their experiences with the 
high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder amongst those who served in the 
military. The aforementioned groups explained these reservations and declined 
to participate once they reviewed the survey. A liaison of another group told me 
that he didn’t want me turning his members into lab rats to further my own 
agenda or career. While on one end of the spectrum there was vocalized 
resistance to the project’s theme, other groups seemed neutral or indifferent, 
ignoring multiple inquiries into working with them.  Other groups seemed 
incredibly disorganized and unprofessional making it a challenge to continue the 
process.   
One participant told me, post-interview, that the survey was the most 
comprehensive and balanced survey he had seen offered to military members.  
He explained that in his lengthy career as a soldier he had seen many surveys 
shared.  He said nearly all of them contained leading and biased questions that 
allowed participants to only portray the positive aspects of the military and 
conflicts as well as questions that didn’t take much thought or reflection.  He 
imagined I would have a difficult time having people participate since this sort of 
balanced approach to researching them was foreign. The other challenge, as one 
liaison explained is that soldiers and veterans feel bombarded with surveys and 
often want to be left alone to live their lives and attempt to readjust to life back in 
the United States. These factors and refusals ended up describing the subject in 
a different way and added to its dimension not through survey statistics but 
through a better understanding of the attitudes and conflicts related to 
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understanding the war and the mentality of troops when they return and their 
comfort in sharing these experiences.  
University groups supporting the active military community and veterans 
on campus were the most responsive such as Brigham Young University in Utah, 
New Mexico State-Las Cruces and the University of Colorado, where I was able 
to conduct interviews. The largest commitment was made through the support 
and interest from the Tillman Foundation, a national group based in Arizona.  
This particular group made suggestions for what would make the foundation 
members and all troops feel more comfortable during the survey and interview. 
They also wanted to clarify if I had any political agendas or premeditated slants 
toward the subject. This foundation’s development and namesake is an important 
narrative about the war in Afghanistan. Pat Tillman was a professional football 
player in the United States who enlisted after 9/11, leaving his athletic career.  
After he was deployed to Iraq and witnessed the intervention, he was critical of 
his country’s methods and purpose in GWOT.  However, he remained in the 
military to fulfill his commitment and was then deployed to Afghanistan.  A fellow 
soldier, who was shooting his weapon recklessly when there was no threat at the 
time, killed him in 2004.  However, his death by “friendly fire” was masked with a 
narrative of a heroic Tillman dying at the hands of the enemy while defending his 
fellow troops.  His family was skeptical of how the story was spun after details of 
his death emerged during their personal inquiry.  This revealed a cover up that 
later publicly embarrassed the U.S. administration.  His widow developed the 
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foundation in his honor, providing active military and veterans with educational 
support through the Tillman Military Scholars program (Pat Tillman Foundation).   
I interviewed Echo in Las Vegas the morning after Bin Laden was killed by 
American military forces in Pakistan.  He had been referred to me by his fellow 
Marine, Charlie, whom I had spoken to the month before.  Echo was the most 
expressive and excitable. His emotions deterred me from thinking he was 
comfortable enough to have his voice recorded. I didn’t even ask.  A main theme 
for this participant was Islam and his perception of the natural violence of its 
followers.  He told me that although it would require him and I in some physically 
compromising positions, he would teach me how to defend myself with a knife so 
that I could protect myself against Muslim men when I returned to Cairo.  When 
storming Kabul during the invasion, he remembers that an Afghan man that was 
working with the Americans raped a younger boy also working alongside 
Americans in a nearby building. He could hear them and said it was the most 
awful sound he ever heard.  When he returned to America and saw Muslims 
walking around, he wanted to go over and take those things off their heads and 
beat them up. After ten years in Las Vegas, I had never seen a Muslim man with 
anything on his head outside of the local mosques.  I asked if he was talking 
about veiled women and he said no, that in fact he felt very bad how they were 
treated because of their men and religion.  We continued with the interview and 
shifted towards him taking the survey.  He hadn’t been comfortable with taking it 
alone or online and preferred to take it when he met me in person. He was 
overjoyed and commented a number of times how amazing it was to talk to 
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someone about Afghanistan.  He never does so.  I handed him my computer and 
he began.  After about ten minutes into the survey, in the corner of the bookstore 
coffee shop, the Adhan, the Muslim call to prayer, started ringing out loud from 
the speakers on my computer.  My stomach dropping was instantaneous with his 
freak out. He started repeating, “what is that!” He was shaking, his face showing 
a range of emotions- then took his hands off the keyboard as though he had 
somehow brought the muezzin to life with his typing.  I quickly muted it, and 
calmed him down apologizing profusely and internally rebuking myself as my 
obvious amateur status as a researcher had shown. He started breathing better 
and said to me with bewilderment. “Why do you have that? I know what it is, but 
why?” I just paused for a second.  “Two reasons. One, I work and am friends with 
Muslims here in town. I like to know the prayer schedule to be respectful in terms 
of when I contact them.  Also, it reminds me of Cairo, which I miss and love very 
much.  It calms me.”  I apologized again saying I didn’t even think of turning it off 
as no one else uses my computer or took the survey on it before.  He paused 
and just simply said, “That’s really cool actually.”  He returned back to the 
surveyed and after we talked after for hours. 




Tens of thousands of U.S. troops have been based in Afghanistan over 
thirteen years building a vast collection of narratives and opinions about their 
experience in Afghan society.  They are members of a foreign military whose 
identities exist outside the norms of their “host” society while attempting to 
encourage a “legitimate” Afghan government that is internationally acceptable.  
Their perceptions and experiences with Afghans depict a complicated description 
of this relationship. Imaginations and prospects surrounding this association were 
produced in two popular discourses based on conflicting masculinities and 
perceived Afghan femininity that anticipated liberation and counterinsurgency.  
This chapter discloses U.S. troop’s explanation of this relationship and its fluid 
nature that contradicts, challenges and reflects the expectations set forth by 
those outside of the sphere of base host relationships. 
Outsiders had portrayed the conflict as a war that was built, won or lost 
through the relationships between U.S. troops and Afghan society. I felt it was a 
natural progression to explore this relationship from sources that experienced it 
firsthand, to better understand the sociology of war. My research site was in the 
United States, the soldiers’ home base, away from the Afghan arena.  It was 
important to also understand the wider national imaginations of the American 
public about the U.S. intervention.  However, discussing Afghans in the U.S. was 
not always welcome and opinions were often strong.   
The U.S. liberation discourse, displayed through Operation Enduring 
Freedom, proclaimed that U.S. troops were deployed with the purpose of fighting 
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terrorists, establishing an Afghan government, and liberating its people from 
oppression and poverty. The views of the troops surveyed and interviewed 
reflected this sentiment. Members of the U.S. Armed Services also believed they 
were deployed to the country for three reasons. 32% believed they were there to 
fight the men responsible for the oppression of the Afghan society. 23% felt their 
goal was to establish a stable, functioning government. While 19% responded 
that it was their mission to free Afghanistan from its suffering. They saw their 
presence not as one of hegemonic geopolitics, but only directly related to the 
process of liberating the country and its people. This chapter will look at soldier’s 
viewpoints of these three motives and the gender implications their views have 
on their mission and Afghan society. From the responses of a survey to one-on-
one interviews, patterns and consensus emerged as U.S. troops expressed their 
thoughts and attitudes. Troops’ viewpoints fall in line and contradict both 
government and public discourse on Afghanistan, the reasons behind the U.S. 
intervention and the good guy liberator/bad guy oppressor dichotomy. 
Propaganda regarding the liberation of Afghanistan fits into a discourse of 
the interventionist in a protective role as contrary to the villainous and oppressive 
masculinity that was symbolized through the Taliban. “The logic of masculinist 
protection appears in the claimed relationship of the United States to people 
outside the West, particularly in Islamic countries, ruled by brutal 
dictatorships…The women of Afghanistan constituted the ultimate victims, putting 
the United States in the position of ultimate protector” (Young, 2003, p. 17).  
Propaganda that placed a heroic and protective protector between the Afghan 
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villains and victims produced roles that seemed stagnant and based on the 
premonition that these identities were based on absolute truths or benevolent 
cross cultural respect of understanding the players and “others” involved.  
Through representing Afghanistan as a female victim, these supposed truths 
reduced the country to a characterization of someone needing to be saved or 
liberated. “U.S. military hegemony but also international trade and financial 
institutions, as well as many Western-based nongovernmental development 
agencies, position them in this way as feminized or infantilized women and 
children under the protection and guidance of the wise and active father” (Young, 
2003, p. 19). Troops responses to these concepts represented how important 
rescuing Afghanistan is to them as individuals and demonstrates how these 
truths and assumptions are not absolute. The responses also show a different 
interpretation from person to person and each of the respondents were impacted 
heavily by the opinions they acquired through these relationships.  
 
4.1. Being the Hero 
U.S. troops were strongly convinced Afghanistan needed to be liberated 
(82%). This viewpoint was strongly ingrained in U.S. doctrine and media 
propaganda. It also became clear through the survey responses and interviews 
that these views held strong for the U.S. troops as well. While most respondents 
were neutral on the notion of it being their responsibility to bring justice to 
Afghanistan, many felt the need to heed the call of their country. An 
overwhelming sense of pride in their reasons for being in Afghanistan can be 
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read through the viewpoints expressed. “To bring stability and civility into the 
country, in particular the ruling government,” is an example of a common mindset 
as to why these troops feel that they are in Afghanistan. Bravo was asked at one 
point before he joined the military, “Do you want to be out here in the great war 
doing something, or do you want to be lazy?” Bravo then proceeded to explain 
how excited he was when he first got to Afghanistan, that he wanted to change 
the world and make a difference. However, by the end of his deployment he 
became disillusioned and all he could think about was getting back home. These 
generalized notions of doing “the right thing” and being the “hero” are based on 
good intentions albeit a simplistic view of the overall situation on the ground. 
These ideals created a masculine gender role that identified the foreign military 
force as the liberator, being the backbone for the U.S. troops’ motivation in their 
quests.  Many respondents also referred to themselves as the “good guys” as 
opposed to what they called the opposition, the “bad guys.”  
I think we are the good guys. We try to follow the rules; we try to do good things. 
The heart of the American people is in a good place. We’ve been there 10 
years… I like to think that my participation was as the good guy [who tries] to 
help out a nation. (Bravo) 
 
The liberation/oppression dichotomy placed the opposition in the role of the 
oppressors. This generalized group is again seen by U.S. discourse and public 
sentiment as well as media propaganda in the same light as the U.S. troops 
being deployed. The opposition is made up of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and various 
fighting groups both foreign and local to Afghanistan. These groups were seen as 
pushing their extreme views on the local Afghan society or subjecting the 
population to harsh treatment. Mistreatment of women, unjust punishments, and 
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“extreme social standards” were common rallying points against this opposition. 
“The Taliban was a harsh time for Afghans, and they needed foreign support to 
oust them,” says one survey respondent. This sentiment created an opposing 
masculinity in the eyes of U.S. service members. Delta described these role 
descriptions:  
I agree that it is not good to group everyone into good guy, bad guy groups. I 
don’t care what nationality he is, if he is firing a weapon at me than he is a bad 
guy, that’s just the way it is…You just become desensitized to the situation. You 
don’t want to think about your enemy. (Delta) 
 
The discourse had oversaturated the connection between Islamic extremism and 
Afghan victimhood. Uniform wrote, “They [Taliban] got the Koran wrong from the 
little bit of knowledge they know.” Uniform felt this was based on ignorance, 
further perpetuating the narrative of their little knowledge. Many troops believed 
the Taliban had misinterpreted their religion and used it in an extreme fashion to 
oppress their society and justify “misogyny.” The opposition, through their 
negative actions, became a masculine oppressor and simultaneously an 
adversary. The opposition would become the target of the troops’ mission in 
liberating Afghanistan and were seen as the conflicting masculinity. 
The conflict between these two roles, liberator and oppressor, were 
originally thought of as clear-cut in the eyes of the U.S. troops. The opposition 
had set themselves apart from the local Afghan population by their actions. This 
created an assumption that most Afghans felt the same way as the U.S. troops 
coming to rescue them. One might think it would be a simple deduction that if a 
society was being mistreated, they would welcome anyone that could help them 
overcome this problem. In some cases respondents did meet these reactions, 
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“Afghans I met adamantly opposed the Taliban philosophy.” The U.S. 
government had built much of their reasoning behind this notion of the United 
States coming to save Afghans. At the same time, the troops reflected this notion 
in their original reasons for the United States getting involved in the conflict.  
Contact with opposition insurgents happened on weekly basis for most of the 
respondents. The type of contact differs with this group compared to the other 
groups being discussed in this chapter. While there was contact by way of 
combat, there was no dialogue between opposition insurgents and U.S. troops. 
Nearly all perceptions would then be formed on exposure not only with direct 
fighting, but also indirectly by way of seeing firsthand the effects of these groups 
on the local civilians, a group in which communication was more common. 
As U.S. troops began to gain experience and have interactions with local 
Afghans and opposition groups, they began to realize that their original 
assumptions might not be as black and white as the media or even their own 
government had portrayed them. The U.S. troops found themselves in an uphill 
battle just to convince the local population that they were in fact the liberators, 
there to help the Afghans. Multiple factors led to this identity crisis and gender 
role confusion. Troops quickly learned that it was not easy to discern between 
the local population and the opposition groups. The Taliban were made up of the 
local populations and not only blended well physically and in societal roles but 
also their viewpoints were founded on their surroundings and country’s history. 
Since the same surroundings and history also shaped the viewpoints of the 
portion of society that did not identify with the Taliban, it should not be a surprise 
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that these “two” groups did not share at least some similar views. “The Taliban 
mix well with the local population because they are the local population,” quipped 
one respondent. As the soldiers lived on bases outside communities, the 
opposition mixed with local Afghans, lived with them, and was a part of their 
social sphere. The soldiers on the other hand, lived in bases outside of 
communities, closed off to the people they were trying to liberate. This 
disconnect would prove to be a huge hurdle for service members as their quest 
to be the liberators they were promised continued. Another aspect that hampered 
the troops’ mission was collateral damage to both physical life and to the societal 
fabric of the Afghan population. “If our bombs landed too close to their villages, 
they would work with the Taliban and give them information on our base,” cited 
Mike. It would be a noted concern of troops that their role to fight the Taliban and 
other opposition forces might have unwanted consequences with this oppressed 
group they were trying to save. Every aspect of the troop’s presence was 
scrutinized. U.S. troops were the outsiders in this country and sentiments 
towards them were not as positive as troops were led to believe. While troops 
believed that they were promoting good ideals and having a positive effect on 
Afghan society, they also realized that the way things were being done might not 
have always been the best for the Afghan society. 
There are a lot of things that we changed: the voting, the rights of the women and 
young girls. All those things changed for the better. So there are some good 
things that happened. But then there are some bad things that happened 
because we were trying to force a lot of our beliefs instead of allowing them to be 
embraced by Afghans. I don't if Afghans would set up their society in the same 
we would. (Delta) 
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As the confidence faded after the initial invasion in 2001 and 2002, it 
became clear to U.S. troops that their original perceptions and role formations 
were not materializing. While in their minds they still held on to the beliefs and 
values that they were on the side of “good,” there to help a people in need, they 
realized that they were not always perceived that way. The Afghan population 
that they came to liberate was wary of foreigners in their land, fighting around 
their villages and killing members of their communities. A backlash began to form 
around the presence of U.S. troops. One service member mentioned that, “Often 
[the Afghan population] saw the Taliban as a heroic force that was fighting the 
foreign occupiers.” Many in the communities would then proclaim, “Yes, we are 
all Taliban,” showing that this was something the average citizen could now be 
proud of. “If IED went off in a village,” the U.S. was blamed for the violent act. 
The opposition groups wouldn’t have to commit these acts if the troops were not 
there. This mindset would eventually lead to a battle over the liberator gender 
role. Both the U.S. troops and their opposition counterparts would seek to lay 
claim to this title in the name of defending the Afghan population.  All 
experiences collected showed that the soldiers’ believed in their mission, meant 
well and were not part of an imperial military.   
Throughout the day, as we broke out the bricked up windows, repainted those 
walls, and re-developed the building into a workable school, the local population 
slowly came out to see what we were doing. It wasn’t until the children of the 
village showed up, late in the afternoon, and began exploring their new school 
that, in my mind, they understood the oppression was over and they were, with 








4.2. Helping Afghans Help Themselves 
 The next main goal of the US intervention in Afghanistan was to create a 
national Afghan government. This government would also be supported through 
the formation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police 
(ANP) forces. There were two driving factors behind this U.S. idea. The first 
notion of the U.S. policy makers was to create a “non-oppressive” Afghan 
leadership that would replace the Taliban and its harsh treatment of the local 
population. The second was to allow the victimized section of society that had 
been mistreated and marginalized to have a voice in their future, country, and 
societal laws. Within the interviews and surveys, troops were questioned both 
about their initial feelings towards the formation of these groups, as well as how 
these groups affected the society they were governing.  
  There was a common theme both among the U.S. government discourse, 
as well as throughout the soldiers surveyed, that there was a strong need for the 
Afghans to form a national government. As U.S. troops based their assumptions 
on their own personal experiences, they felt a stable centralized government 
could be formed and would govern effectively. The idea was to empower the 
oppressed masses. In the eyes of the troops, this empowerment would go hand 
in hand with the liberation discourse by giving the Afghan civilians the tools 
needed to take care of themselves and their country after they were no longer 
under Taliban control. Since one of the first priorities of OEF was to remove the 
oppressive Taliban, the de facto government at the time of the invasion, it was 
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apparent the next step would be to fill that void. It was also implied by the troops 
that these government forces would be supported by the Afghan population. As 
with the removal of the opposition forces, these assumptions would prove 
challenging as roles within the society did not always fit into the United States 
troops’ preconceived ideas.  
After the creation of the government and ANA and ANP forces, troops 
found themselves in direct contact with these groups, often working alongside 
them.  Weekly and daily contact was prevalent throughout the survey group in 
regards to ANA and ANP forces. These interactions were primarily through joint 
operations or within a training capacity. “Working joint border control operations 
at the busiest border crossing from Pakistan (Torkham Gate),” commented one 
respondent. Other interactions with ANA and ANP forces occurred on base both 
in passing, and during off duty hours such as dining. “I enjoyed meeting them 
and hearing about their lives,” one of the U.S. soldiers responded in the survey. 
These initial feelings fell in line with the troops’ original lines of thinking. Afghans 
were rising through the ranks of their societal hierarchies. They were no longer 
just an oppressed group under the rule of a heavy-handed regime. The U.S. 
troops had provided opportunities for Afghans and now they could better their 
country as a whole.  
Similar to the preconceived notions about fighting the oppressors, there 
would be unforeseen flaws in the U.S. ideals to create a better Afghanistan. With 
only limited knowledge of Afghan societal structure, troops were unprepared for 
the difficulties in pressuring Afghans to adopt a central form of government. With 
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a history and focus on a tribal culture, Afghans were apprehensive about 
adopting a new mindset when it came to groups governing their lives:  
It goes back to the fundamental focus on self preservation and the inability to 
know or care (or know to care) about the government. In fact, as my platoon and 
I were setting the conditions for the 1st-ever democratic elections in the history of 
the country, we discovered that just about nobody even knew what a Provincial 
government was, let alone what purpose it served or why it was important. 
Teaching them what voting was, and how to do it was another massive struggle 
against conceptual inertia. (Tango) 
 
Not only does Tango show the struggles soldiers have within this excerpt from 
his interview, but it also shows the connection between liberation and 
democracy. Soldiers thought that Afghans could not be fully liberated without 
having a democratic government to support their new freedoms.  
When questioned whether “Afghan communities trust and support Afghan 
National Army and the Afghan National Police?” 59% of the respondents felt the 
Afghan communities did not trust and support the ANA and ANP. Only 12.5% 
thought the communities did trust and support these groups, while the remainder 
of the respondents remained neutral on the issue. 75% of respondents felt there 
was no trust of the current government by civilians. Questions must be raised 
when comparing these statistics with that of trust between communities and local 
tribal leadership. 87.5% of respondents felt that communities did trust this more 
local and historically Afghan form of government. These numbers express 
disconnect between the two cultures and how they feel their societies can be 
effectively governed. While this statistic points out only one discrepancy between 
U.S. discourse and Afghan society, this idea of misunderstanding and lack of 
knowledge of the other repeats itself throughout interactions between U.S. troops 
and Afghans. “Understanding the ties between local populations and their tribal 
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leaders and in depth political analysis of how these relationships work can only 
help line leaders in the field who have to deal with these individuals on a daily or 
weekly basis,” noted one interviewee. 
 While some of the problems lie within the basic differences and histories 
between the U.S. and Afghan cultures, other factors led to the distrust and lack of 
support for the Afghan government and its supporting forces. Soldiers noted 
rampant corruption within the ranks of the newly formed Afghan groups. This 
placed the Afghan population in a similar situation to that of their previous rulers, 
the Taliban. It showed the Afghan civilians that the Afghan government, troops 
and police forces might not be people you could trust, or would have your best 
interests in mind. Like the Taliban, they may be only trying to exploit their power 
for whatever they feel is best for them and not for the country as a whole.  While 
the new form of government may not be oppressing the society with extreme 
laws or obtuse women’s rights, they were still becoming a feminized population. 
The masculine oppressors had simply changed from Afghans under the label of 
the Taliban, to Afghans under the label of government officials, ANA or ANP. 
Again while the intentions of the U.S. troops were well placed, their shortfalls 
were not lost on them. When asked what Afghan civilians need to be protected 
from, many responses included the Afghan government alongside opposition 
forces such as the Taliban. “Corrupt police, corrupt government, and the 
Taliban,” answered one service member. “The Taliban and their own 
government,” responded another. These shortcomings within the government 
and forces set up by the U.S. discourse only added to the uphill battle in their 
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fight to liberate the Afghan people. Similarly to the problems encountered from 
fighting with opposition forces, U.S. actions were progressively being seen 
negatively in the eyes of the Afghan population. This would continue to work 
against their ideal situation of the troops liberating the Afghan people and instead 
add to the notion that the U.S. troops were in fact the ones oppressing the 
Afghan society. They had developed a new “official” Afghan masculinity and were 
concerned when it didn’t match the liberating image they had made in their own 
likeness.    
 
4.3. The Liberated Population 
While women became an easy rallying point for America’s westernized 
culture, the troops surveyed had many opinions about all aspects of the group 
they were going to liberate. The Afghan civilians were initially viewed as a 
feminized society under the oppression of the Taliban and other extremist groups 
within the country. They lacked basic rights, freedoms and opportunities. The 
soldiers’ views would mirror that of the U.S. media and cultural perspectives; 
Afghans needed to be saved.  
82% of US troops surveyed either agree or strongly agree that 
Afghanistan should be liberated while most respondents were neutral on whether 
the Afghan people actually want to be liberated. This contradiction is a strong 
indicator as to the U.S. perspective on the Afghan situation. It shows that they 
feel they know what is best for the Afghan people, even if they do not. That is a 
  Sarah Cosette  57 
 
 
bold statement to make about a society that one is unfamiliar with, one that will 
continually haunt the troops efforts.  
The amount of interaction between groups within Afghan society varied 
greatly. One group in particular, Afghan women, had the least amount of contact 
with U.S. troops yet elicited some of the strongest responses. Most reported that 
they did not have contact with Afghan women, although many did respond to the 
question; “briefly describe Afghan women’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc).” 
Most responded with descriptions such as shy, submissive, reserved and 
subservient. However, based on their individual experiences, views towards 
women contradicted each other as well as U.S. social discourse and 
propaganda. One respondent commented that, “In the part of the country I was 
in, women were hardly second class citizens. They weren’t any kind of citizen at 
all. They were more like livestock.” Another went on to describe that:  
They served as a measure of a man’s status, were completely stripped of their 
own sense of identity and self-worth, and could be severely punished (up to and 
including banishment or death) for the slightest infraction of the Taliban’s gender 
“norms.” It is utterly tragic to see the wholesale annihilation of the human spirit. 
(Tango) 
 
Comments like this reinforced the ideas of Afghan women as victims in the 
liberation propaganda and challenged the respect of norms discussed within 
counterinsurgency.  However, it also fit in with the stereotypes regarding the 
women challenged by critics of this propaganda.   
An interviewee went on to describe women:  
My sense is that women are not hidden, generally, or segregated, at least not in 
the public space.  I cannot speak to much extent on the traditional arrangements 
in the privacy of an Afghan home; however, women are everywhere in 
Afghanistan, in public: they are selling goods at markets; they are working in 
offices; they are in the Afghan military and police (now); they are teachers and 
leaders in their parliament.  Even traditionally, my understanding is that women 
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are not ostracized as they are in some more radically fundamentalist Muslim 
countries, or as they were during the Taliban rule, which was atypical of Afghan 
culture. (Victor) 
 
This participant contradicts the generalized victim description in their experience 
and explains it as a “western construct”:  
It is hard for me to conclude that, with some exceptions, an Afghan woman 
functioning in the ways I described, or, as perhaps the majority do, tending to the 
home in more traditional ways – farming, cooking, and the like – are second 
class citizens: I think that is something of a western construct, akin to imagining 
that women in the US who choose to be housewives, home school children, 
pursue or not pursue college or graduate level education, are second class 
citizens. (Victor) 
 
The media played a major role in forming the opinions of troops before 
they experienced Afghanistan for themselves. While many described their 
reasoning for joining the fight in Afghanistan on reasoning sold to them by media 
and politics, some became exposed to the sometimes one-sidedness of the 
profession.  
You’re seeing many journalists but I didn’t meet a single one that didn't have an 
agenda or didn't have a preconceived notion and opinion. Regardless of what 
you said, this is how they would say it. (Alpha) 
 
Delta added to questioning the motives of the media and its effect on the U.S. 
thought process when rationalizing their actions.  
Our culture in a sense, when it comes to war, is limited in this way. What comes 
to us going into another country and taking the life, it's not that hard because 
they're the enemy. Did they forget that there's a human side to that and they 
have families, a wife and kids, that they were breathing a one-time? They (US 
society) don't look at it that way. (Delta) 
 
As for the actual interaction or lack thereof between Afghan women, and U.S. 
troops, one respondent noted that it minimized the effectiveness foreign armed 
forces would have in their goals. By not being able to speak with and hear from 
women, the troops could not get a full picture of all the problems they felt needed 
to be corrected. This, in turn, would lead troops to rely on what they have heard 
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from media, their own government and speculation to form their opinions about 
problems facing Afghan women. They also revealed that perhaps the 
segregation of women, while seen as extreme, has been possibly perceived as a 
defense mechanism from the number of foreign militaries that have been based 
in Afghanistan.  While women are often seen as victims, there is also a strong 
sense of protection over their bodies.  The respondent went on to say, “U.S. will 
have even less effects because they do not produce offspring with the local 
female population.” He said to his knowledge, he did not know of any service 
members having carnal relationships with local women”. He admitted, “I am sure 
it has happened but I have never heard of it personally.” I then asked if this is 
difficult for soldiers, hoping he would dig deeper into the issue. He said, “No, they 
didn't have a difficult time not being with Afghan women.” The respondent 
believed that there was evidence of a Russian genetic legacy based on ethnic 
appearance and that they, “can't even imagine the political fallout/disaster of 
getting an Afghan woman pregnant.” He wouldn’t, “necessarily want to pursue an 
Afghan woman, as they are all covered up, dirty and poor. It's clear the Russians 
left something behind besides weapons and airfields.” The respondent believes 
that the U.S. military has been very respectful of cultural norms regarding women 
in Afghanistan. 
All respondents reported interaction with Afghan men either daily or 
weekly. The descriptions of Afghan men varied greatly from respondent to 
respondent. Responses varied more when asked about men rather than women 
because the responses were based on actual experience rather than 
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perceptions. In the case of Afghan women, descriptions seem to be based more 
on common gender rhetoric with minimal firsthand experience, while experiences 
with men were more specific. Although responses varied, the most common 
response was that Afghan men are proud and have a strong love of their country. 
This description can be problematic for U.S. troops when identifying them as a 
feminized population needing liberation. Afghan men may view this role 
identification negatively and take actions to defend their masculinity, often siding 
with the opposition. 
Afghan society was most often described as family oriented. This idea 
also works in favor of the views previously expressed in this chapter citing 
reasons U.S. troops have difficulty separating opposition fighters from foreign 
civilians. With strong community and family bonds, opposition fighters can easily 
slip in and out of the opposition role as well as spread influence to other Afghan 
civilians. This fluidity between roles benefits the opposition forces greatly over 
that of their U.S. counterparts. 
Troops did report some positive reactions to their presence. The most 
commonly believed positive effects of U.S. troops in Afghanistan were access to 
jobs and education. Some troops also reported women having more freedoms as 
well due to their presence, “Women have greater freedoms, children can attend 
schools, and civic utilities can function properly”. Access to aid and humanitarian 
services was also brought up multiple times. When looking at the positive effects, 
these items must be viewed in consideration to the overall conflict within 
Afghanistan and its history.  Access to jobs and education are important societal 
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needs and encourage growth across all genders. However, these needs tend to 
be overshadowed by more pressing issues such as safety, governing bodies and 
foreign invaders. It can be deduced that until Afghanistan is more stabilized, 
growth in more progressive ideals such as women’s rights will be put on hold.  
 As part of the survey, troops were asked a series of questions about their 
level of education about Afghanistan. 94% of respondents “strongly agreed” that 
U.S. forces receive education and training about their host community, society, 
and culture. Answers were mixed when asked whether they received enough 
training before and during their tour in Afghanistan. 57% of troops felt that more 
training in cultural and social customs would be the most beneficial when 
interacting with Afghans.  
These ideas point out that the notion of preconceived ideas or lack of 
knowledge about a people or their customs and culture could be detrimental 
when trying to liberate them. Further study and training by military forces may 
have concluded different gender roles and identified better societal needs from a 
liberator or if a liberator is needed at all.  
It would have been easy to look at these people, both combatants and civilians, 
as being less than what we are and inferior.  These people are survivors and 
absolutely capable of taking care of themselves and solving problems, even 
though their methods may be different than ours. (Victor) 
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 5. Hearts and Minds Discourse 
As the U.S. war in Afghanistan progressed, roles changed with the 
changing situation on the ground. This led to both a change in the discourse by 
outside actors such as the U.S. government and media as well as with the U.S. 
troops’ personal views. The initial roles of the U.S. troops being liberators, 
fighting the oppressive terrorist groups and saving the Afghan civilians, had been 
blurred leaving the U.S. to reevaluate their place in Afghanistan. While the main 
goals of fighting terrorism, establishing a national government and providing 
Afghan civilians with a better life remained, the ways in which the troops would 
need to go about achieving these goals had to change dramatically. With Afghan 
civilians not embracing the U.S. troops in their country or the government and 
security forces they were trying to put in place, U.S. policy would need to change 
its policies towards Afghan civilians. Rather than being seen as a passive group 
under the influence of the Taliban or U.S. troops, they would play a more active 
role. Afghan civilians would need to be convinced of the U.S. troop’s goals and 
be utilized by the U.S. troops. This shift in strategy still produces the same results 
of fighting terrorism and liberating the Afghan people, just through different 
means. This chapter will look at the causes for the need to change strategies and 
the new gender roles that would be created in the process.  
Through the interview process and survey responses, troops described 
what they experienced on the ground. Within these descriptions, six themes 
became apparent in the process to change from a liberation discourse to the 
counterinsurgency strategy of “The Campaign to Win the Hearts and Minds” of 
  Sarah Cosette  63 
 
 
Afghan civilians; education/training, role confusion, money/loyalty, trust and 
respect, cultural compatibility, and danger to the troops. These themes will be 
discussed and analyzed from the viewpoints of the U.S. troops serving in 
Afghanistan. 
The U.S. military was attempting to counter these built up representations 
and behavior of troops through counterinsurgency doctrine.  Symbolizing the 
Afghans through a female victim had proved to be problematic and didn’t match 
the range of identities and communities they had within these relationships.   
Even the choice to focus on the burka and veil in Afghanistan as a sign of 
progress further made this conflict about  something inanimate and not human.  
We need to recognize that, whatever effect it has had on the women who wear it, 
the veil has also had a radical impact on our own field of vision, on our capacity 
to recognize Muslim societies for something other than misogyny and patriarchal 
violence. Our ability to respond, morally and politically, in a responsible way to 
these forms of violence will depend on extending these powers of sight 
(Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2012, p. 353).   
 
Counterinsurgency extended these “powers of sight” and claimed through 
practicing “lessons learned,” troops could move the Afghans away from the 
oppressive elements of their society. Troops are conflicted by these constructs 
offered in the two discourses.  They are told if they exhibit these qualities when 
interacting with Afghans they have the power to change the course of the war.  
However, they place responsibility not just on insurgents and explain that they 
witness Afghans’ civilians and members of the state apparatus who can be 
apathetic to their vision or work against it even when cultural considerations are 
made. This problematizes cultural considerations and a hearts and minds policy 
that can make the Afghan population support a foreign mission like Operation 
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Enduring Freedom and its practices.  Troops develop and make their own 
constructs of Afghans based on their interactions with them just as Afghans do 
the same. Gender roles and social constructs produced are not from biological 
differences in foreign troops and Afghans. “Instead we see gender identities as 
effects of power-laden social practices, through which cultural scripts are 
produced and bodies and selves endowed with social meaning” (Coleman, and 
Bassi, 2011). Both of these focal points produce opinions and interactions that 
affect the relationship roles developed in this intervention.  However, the 
outcome of these exchanges are heavily influenced outside of the personal 
contacts had, by a myriad of considerations such as poverty and tribal affiliations 
and wider base host relationships.  Even when cultural components are 
explained, it needs to be put into the perspective and experience of what it is to 
be a member of a foreign military.  “Occasionally, Afghan women wear the burqa 
because it provides protection from dust to keep the clothing clean… The burqa 
also gives them privacy, allowing them to hide their identity. Unfortunately, it may 
also be worn by males who wish to hide their gender identity, and occasionally by 
women, with the intent of attacking coalition forces with hidden weapons or 
explosives” (Murphy, 2010, p. 78).  If a U.S. Culture Newsletter was produced by 
Afghans explaining foreign troops to Afghans, no doubt it would be richer than 
the constructs offered in the propaganda, whether in support or defiance of their 
presence.  It would also as this excerpt mentioned have to define the foreign 
troops through how their cultural or institutional norms could be used to harm 
Afghans.  Afghans constructs of this intervention and relationship need to be 
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understood through their lives not just their culture before the U.S. can learn how 
they are a problem within this supposed solution for the country.  Focusing on 
culture in hearts and minds ignores the combination of culture met by foreign 
presence that troubles this relationship and produces negative outcomes, not the 
Afghan culture itself.   
 
5.1 Education and Training 
U.S. troops realized a necessity for education and training about the 
culture and customs of Afghanistan in order to carry out the strategy so that they 
not only understand what they are implementing but also how they are going to 
proceed within the foreign culture they are placed. The idea of education and 
training was brought up in the surveys and interviews to see if they felt they had 
the proper knowledge and skill sets to carry out the discourse they were being 
asked. In the early stages of the conflict, U.S. troops’  skills were primarily based 
on fighting terrorism and combat situations. As the war progressed and the 
strategy changed to the hearts and minds campaign, the troops were asked to 
take a new approach. With this new approach came new roles for most of the 
servicemen and women. This transition asked them to step outside of their 
combat roles and interact on more personal levels with Afghans. This led me to 
ask them questions to see if they felt they had enough education and training for 
this new role.  
88% of troops believe that the campaign to win hearts and minds is 
important. Only 50% believed the Hearts and Minds Campaign worked well while 
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they were personally deployed in the country. When asked what they thought 
could help improve the effectiveness of the hearts and minds campaign, 78% felt 
that more non-military efforts would be effective. This shows the troops 
realization that although they were a fighting force, they would need to step 
outside of their primary roles.  
Troops typically get trained to fight, and it was apparent through the 
surveys and interviews that these troops were in Afghanistan under the primary 
purpose to fight terrorism. As the original liberator role was not as effective as 
those in command of the U.S. forces would have liked, the strategies were 
adapted. The Hearts and Minds Campaign would take the civilians out of their 
oppressed role that previous discourses had placed them in and instead utilize 
their help in liberating their own country. This change in discourse placed the 
success of the missions on both parties working together. For these groups to 
work effectively common knowledge of each other’s roles in the conflict, cultural 
norms, and way to communicate would be necessary.  
97% of troops felt that it is important for U.S. forces to receive education 
and training about their host community, society and culture.  Responses were 
mixed on whether or not they felt they received enough education and training 
before and during their tours in Afghanistan. The most common area of 
education desired by troops was to have more knowledge of the social and 
cultural customs they would have to interact with. Many troops reported that not 
understanding the culture reflected poorly on the troops and made their job to win 
the hearts and minds of the Afghans much harder.  
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Sierra described situations where lack of language skills led to interesting 
interactions with Afghans. “Since there is usually little verbal communication due 
to the fact that we don’t speak the same language, there is a charades dance 
and that always accompanies these situations.” This becomes a disadvantage 
when trying to express the goals and reasoning for U.S. troops being in 
Afghanistan to Afghans, but also day-to-day activities such as buying good from 
a local bazaar:  
We didn't really get information on how to interact with them [Afghans]. There are 
social faux pas made that would be viewed as offensive because we didn’t know 
any better (greeting with the wrong hand, etc). We weren’t taught even how to 
say hello or anything. Most of the troops are small town and not even familiar 
with the concept as to how foreign interactions can be construed as rude or 
offensive even if you mean well. (Sierra) 
 
It was also noted that while many positive things were being accomplished for 
the civilian population, the good intentions were getting lost in translation as the 
result of mediocre relations.  
When troops were asked what the best action they could take to better the 
relationships with Afghan civilians, the most common response concluded that 
troops must “learn more about their culture and try to educate them [Afghan 
civilians] as to what we are doing in their country.” Some responses focused less 
on how Afghan civilians felt and more on how troops could accomplish their 
goals, noting that it was “Important for soldiers to learn about culture in order to 
accomplish soldiers’ goals not necessarily out of any respect for afghans.” 
Foxtrot explained his views on the differences education made between the 
ranks of U.S. troops:  
Higher-ranking officers are able to relate to the situation and Afghan civilians a 
little bit better because they are trained to see the bigger picture. What makes 
being in Afghanistan and trying to fulfill your role is that your first and foremost 
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concern is that you want to get home safe at the end of the day. If I have to kill a 
civilian or two to make that happen, as the lowest ranking soldier, I can deal with 
that. (Foxtrot) 
 
This experience shows that differences in rank and training played a role in an 
individual’s actions. Comments such as these show a tough transition for troops 
in sharing their role as a liberator with the Afghan population.  
Reactions to the survey and interview questions leads to the belief that 
troops must gain knowledge of a society in order to interact with it successfully 
and efficiently. Basic understandings of customs and language would help troops 
not only accomplish their missions but allow the host population to have a 
chance to understand what the troops are there to accomplish. This richer 
interaction might lead to less stereotyping of cultures and individuals on both 
sides of the conflict, allowing true evaluations of progress made to those not in 
the field who are determining future policies.  
 
5.2 Role Confusion 
As mentioned in the previous section, troops underwent a role change as 
counterinsurgency strategies were altered based on results on the ground. 
Troops went from a liberating force there to save the oppressed Afghan society 
from their terrorist oppressors to a group that now had to work with the Afghan 
civilians and treat them as equals. Not only did they need to work with the Afghan 
population, but they also had to convince the Afghan population that they should 
work with the troops. The Hearts and Minds Campaign had become a tug of war 
battle with the opposition over the acceptance and support of the Afghan 
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population. This new assignment thrust U.S. troops into a role they did not 
initially prepare for:  
What was abundantly clear to us, though, was that our large cumbersome 
conventional Army was not well suited for the long-term smoldering campaigns 
we found ourselves in… So, while the bullets were flying and the roads were 
exploding, our military began transforming—in a process that still continues. It’s 
been a complete restructuring. (Tango) 
 
Their reactions and struggles can be seen through the conversations presented 
in the surveys and interviews.  
The change in strategy came as a shock to most troops interviewed. They 
did not feel that their job in Afghanistan was to befriend the Afghan community 
but rather to physically fight terrorism. Foxtrot noted that he and his colleagues 
were in Afghanistan to fight. “The Army found itself having to build civil 
institutions. The troops didn’t like that, and they didn’t join the Army to do that. It 
isn’t what we were trained to do.” While actions such as befriending the Afghan 
community and building civil institutions was meant to fight terrorism by 
empowering the civilians to not have to rely on the Taliban anymore, U.S. troops 
preferred more direct methods.  
The troops, however, did see the reasoning behind the change to a 
counterinsurgency strategy even if they were unsure if the strategy was possible. 
Only 55% of troops interviewed believed that it is possible to win the hearts and 
minds of the Afghan people.  One would expect this number to be higher in order 
to have a chance of this counterinsurgency strategy working. U.S. forces were 
the policy makers’ eyes and ears on the ground. Their reports would be the 
influential factor in shaping policies. If the strategies were indeed based on the 
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troop’s experiences, then there had to be another reason for such low confidence 
towards the Hearts and Minds Campaign. The responses within some of the 
interviews leads us to believe that this disconnect between being a fighting force 
and that of a humanitarian force brought on an identity crisis for many. The idea 
that troops trained for combat would now be trying to sell their case for being in 
Afghanistan to its people seems absurd. Troops were now being asked to 
provide aid, education and training, build schools and provide basic goods to the 
Afghan population:  
We taught their military different tactics, techniques and procedures, helped them 
bring water and electricity to villages that didn't have it before, helped build 
schools with NGOs and brought clothing and shoes to remote villages.  Hopefully 
to set a good example and show them that U.S. soldiers were not all evil 
infidels... (Delta) 
 
U.S. troops accepted this new mission and performed it to the best of their 
abilities, but even with these best efforts the question has to be asked whether or 
not the troops were the correct group for the task. One respondent felt that only 
5% of the time his training as a soldier was needed in his activities in the country 
and that the other 95% of the time a different set of skills and training would be 
needed. Troops were also split as to whether or not more or less combat with 
insurgents would help win the hearts and minds of Afghans. More often than not 
troops felt more aid to the country was the answer. An overall analysis of the 
data and responses reveal that most soldiers had the original liberator mindset 
from before their tours of duty or from the early stages of it. These preconceived 
notions or first impressions would seem nearly impossible to break free from 
leading to role confusion when it came time to switch to the hearts and minds 
strategy.  
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Constant fighting with opposition groups would lead to this role confusion 
as well. As stated previously, opposition groups mixed well with the local 
population or were even a part of the population. Troops would need to enter 
communities with the hopes of gaining trust and respect of the local population 
knowing that some of these same people could be plotting against them. This 
constant struggle to separate friend from foe while trying to engage the 
population respectfully and constructively almost seems impossible.  Many 
recognized this dilemma and took the approach that it was the Afghans 
responsibility in the end to liberate their own country. Answering one survey a 
question, a respondent explained:  
Now, after a decade, we are making significant progress helping the Afghans - 
key phrase, "Helping the Afghans" - build the security capacity necessary to 
protect their people from the internal threat (Taliban resurgence)…helping the 
Afghans bring their own stability and security. So, we are providing now more 
than ever the opportunity for the AFGHAN people to succeed.  
 
Many troops towards the end or after their deployments began to make this 
dissociation from their earlier roles. They noted that they were no longer the 
liberators but rather providing the tools necessary for the Afghans themselves to 
become the liberators. Ultimately most troops reflect back on their roles in 
Afghanistan with contradicting statements, proud of what they have 
accomplished, yet unsure of which accomplishments helped the Afghan society 
or whether it would leave a lasting impression on the population.   
 
5.3 Money and Loyalty 
When asked what the best action U.S. troops can take to better their 
relationships with Afghan civilians, one respondent replied, “Stop paying for 
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everything…always be respectful.” The hearts and minds strategy is based 
around the idea of building relationships. Relationships must be formed between 
the troops and the Afghan population that is stronger than that of the relationship 
between the opposition group and the Afghan population. The leading group with 
the strongest relationship will command the loyalty of the population. Many of the 
troops surveyed noted key behaviors of the Afghan society that made forming 
lasting and loyal bonds difficult for either side. These behaviors and patterns can 
be analyzed within the constructs of role formation and progression while relating 
back to the hearts and minds discourse.  
Afghans have been in a state of constant struggle over their country with 
both internal and external forces for centuries. This lack of stability has turned 
them into persons of opportunity, taking advantage of opportunities as they arise 
while rarely looking at the long-term solutions. This mindset is a product of their 
environment and they project it onto this conflict just as they have in the past. 
The U.S. forces assumed that Afghan civilians would see the long-term benefits 
of the troops’ invasion and help in reducing the grip of the oppressive opposition. 
As policies shifted towards the hearts and minds doctrine, U.S. troops needed to 
engage Afghans and convince them to help and support the troops’ mission.  
One direct way to do this was through the use of money. Troops could pay for 
the support of the population by offering rewards for information or provide 
paying jobs with steady incomes. However, problems arose with this line of 
thinking. Troops reported that while paying for the support of the local population 
did have short-term benefits, it did not create a lasting bond. They told of stories 
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of the local population helping U.S. troops one day and opposition groups the 
next:  
They need to stop playing both sides. They are getting paid by us to perform 
duties for us, and allowed privileges that end up giving them information that they 
then end up sharing with enemies and screwing us over…They need to not take 
advantage of the situations. (Sierra) 
 
These notions expressed by Sierra represent questionable practices by the U.S. 
forces and policy makers. The idea that Afghans can be bought and controlled is 
a strong statement of a masculine force over a civilian population. The Afghans 
can be seen as trying to make the best of the situation they are being put in by 
the U.S. policies. Their actions can be seen as not as taking advantage of the 
U.S. troops but rather a reaction to the policies forced upon them.   
When asked what the troops feel is the worst action Afghan civilians can 
take that would result in harming the relationship with U.S. troops, one 
respondent noted that Afghan civilians shouldn’t “continue to play both sides of 
the fence and cooperate with the Taliban.” This notion of loyalty did not seem to 
sit well with the troops. Possibly due to the sense of loyalty and pride engrained 
in them through their service, troops struggled with the lack of loyalty when it 
came to the Afghan population. Troops felt they were there to help; Afghans 
should realize that and do the right thing. If that didn’t work they would simply 
hire the Afghan civilians with the idea that they would be loyal to their job. 
Troops would realize that Afghan loyalty, “could only be rented, not bought.”  
In the interviews, Foxtrot expanded on the idea of Afghan civilians 
supporting both sides. He explained that while the U.S. troops are in Afghanistan 
they can provide some benefits. Over the long term this might not be the case:  
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Afghans asked: Why are you [U.S. troops] here, are you going to be here 
tomorrow? I had a hard time with that myself, actually developing a relationship 
with them. They want to know are we going to be here tomorrow. If I work with 
you, are you going to be here when someone threatens my family? In a larger 
cultural sense you destroyed our government and our civil institutions, are you 
going to stay here and rebuild? (Foxtrot) 
 
He went on to explain that the aid work being done has the same effect as 
paying Afghans for their services. All of the benefits that U.S. troops can provide 
Afghans are temporary. “They'd rather have the medical attention than not, but if 
that's the only time they see you for 6 months... They still have to live in their 
communities for the rest of the year.”  This disconnect from the troops way of 
thinking is an example of how roles created by people not experiencing the 
conflict can negatively affect those involved. A proper study of Afghan culture 
may have revealed some of these issues prior to implementing policies with little 
chance of success.  
Another aspect of loyalty comes about with the physical living 
arrangements among the troops, opposition and civilians. The troops lived on 
bases built on Afghan land, while the opposition lived within Afghan communities. 
One interviewee brought up the notion that, “If the Taliban is supporting a village, 
then the villagers will likely support the Taliban.” The opposition forces would 
have constant contact and play a bigger role in the daily lives of Afghans than 
that of troops whose interaction would be limited to missions entering and exiting 
communities. This can be analyzed to show that the group with the most contact 
with the civilians will have the most influence over them. Stronger relationships 
will be formed and their ideals will be more easily sold to the population. One 
respondent pointed at that the local civilians “side with the Taliban. They have a 
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choice of what they want; many civilians seem to pick the side that they feel is 
going to win the fight.” This shows that opposition groups have a great influence 
over the population they live with. Therefore, troops are at a disadvantage when 
building relationships with Afghan civilians and continue to struggle for their 
support and loyalty.  
The last aspect of money and loyalty that can be gained from the insight  
of the troops’ responses is that of corruption. U.S. troops were quick to point out 
the waste of resources and money on many different levels. Local officials within 
Afghan government positions that were appointed by U.S. troops were a main 
source of frustration with the troops in regards to their corruption. 
Mismanagement of aid projects was also a topic of discussion. While troops 
reported trying to handle these situations as best they can, in most cases they 
have little recourse to these actions. These types of issues further strained the 
relations of U.S. troops and Afghan civilians. If the civilians could not trust the 
U.S. forces, how were they supposed to work together? One respondent would 
have liked Afghan civilians to:  
Be more honest with us about sources of local corruption and what local 
development requirements are. But after 10 years of U.S. waste, poor project 
management, and engendering corruption ourselves (while contributing to the 
cycle of violence that they cannot escape from), I don't see this happening - they 
have no incentive to do any of that.  
 
This interview shows the strain on troops to build relations with Afghan civilians 
and win their support and loyalty towards the U.S. cause. One of the troops 
noted that “hearts and minds doesn’t stop insurgency, it tries to convince the 
population to stop the insurgency.” While this notion of how the discourse is 
meant to work is not lost on troops, they realize that the position they are put in 
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or have created themselves, puts them at a disadvantage when in competition 
with opposition groups.  
 
5.4 Trust and Respect 
The success of the hearts and minds campaign is heavily influenced by 
the relationships formed between U.S. troops and Afghan civilians. A major 
component brought up by the respondents in building these relationships was 
trust and respect.  Trust and respect relates both ways in the relationship of U.S. 
troops and Afghan civilians while having a direct effect on the relations with the 
opposition groups. Through the survey and interview questions, it was analyzed 
that the troops felt strongly that they should be able to trust and respect the 
Afghans just as much as the Afghans should trust and respect the troops.  
 U.S. forces originally came to Afghanistan with the hopes and 
assumptions that the Afghan civilians would welcome them and support them. 
This notion of being liberators helping the Afghans would garner trust and 
support out of the sheer act of troops fighting for the rights of the less fortunate 
population. After it became apparent these earlier notions would not come to 
fruition and the trust and support would have to be earned, the 
counterinsurgency strategy was changed to reflect this. The Hearts and Minds 
Campaign was built around the idea of gaining the support of the local population 
and with it the trust and respect that would follow.  
 Troops were asked whether or not Afghan communities trusted and 
supported U.S. military forces with two common themes resulting. The first theme 
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can be seen as a result of Afghans history with foreign invaders and occupiers. 
As one respondent noted, “It is difficult for the Afghans to put up with the 
sustained presence of foreign troops in their country.”  In an interview with one of 
the troops they reported the idea that most Afghans, “will fight whoever is seen 
as an occupier.” Since most opposition groups were part of the Afghan society in 
some form they would not be labeled as occupiers. As for the U.S. forces, which 
built bases on Afghan land, conducted missions within their communities, and 
had foreign customs and language, it would be easy to see how they quickly 
became occupiers in the eyes of Afghans. With this label to fight against, it would 
be much harder for troops to win the hearts and minds of the local population 
over that of the opposition groups. One of the troops compared this idea to the 
notion of how the U.S. would feel if Afghans had invaded the U.S. Would 
Americans not be wary of the foreigners not matter how good the Afghan 
intentions were? Charlie asked, “… and how it would be if they came over and 
kicked our doors down? It would take a lot of effort and time for them to know 
how to work with our hearts and minds.” 
 The second theme, and probably the most prevalent through all aspects of 
the research conducted, was the negative effects of harming the civilian 
population, life or property, though military efforts against the opposition. This 
notion of harming the Afghan civilians U.S. troops were trying to protect, struck a 
chord with the survey respondents. Delta added his thoughts in losing trust with 
civilians and the repercussions of this: 
They could get one US soldier and kill 20 or 30 civilians, that's their mentality. 
That is a hard thing because whenever this happens it doesn't matter how 
friendly we are with a village, as soon as they get the first casualties, especially 
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children and women, they don't like you very much anymore. You become the 
enemy because of who you are and what you represent. (Delta) 
 
When asked what the worst action troops can take that would result in harming 
the relationships with Afghan civilians, the most common response was, 
“Collateral damage of persons and property.” Many troops noted how hard it was 
to gain the respect of the civilians when they were kicking down their doors in 
search of opposition forces. Alpha retold accounts of troops’ smallest actions that 
had negative effects on building trust and respect from Afghans. “I saw guys 
throwing trash out of the convoys. Instead of throwing it in trashcans, they would 
just dump it out the ground. So their [Afghan’s] perception of us must be very 
negative, for we are very dirty, we are very disrespectful.” 
  It can be seen through this study that while the official discourse had 
changed to a hearts and minds strategy, liberation tactics were still in use. The 
use of force to combat insurgents while trying to provide aid to civilians may look 
good on paper, but in reality was difficult practice due to the opposition being so 
heavily entrenched with the local population. Foxtrot noted that small gestures 
can go a long way in gaining support of Afghans, even in less than ideal 
situations:  
It is especially embarrassing to the man of the house to bust his door down and 
search his home and family. …there are ways to handle it properly, certainly a 
public apology in front of the household if they didn't turn out to be anything is 
fairly effective if it's done right. Also, if you compensate them for the door you 
may have broken might help as well. (Foxtrot)  
 
These deeds can surely help in trying to make the best of mistakes, but they do 
not help in the overall disrespect of foreign troops occupying the Afghans land.  If 
troops were fighting insurgents, most certainly it would have negative effects on 
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some portion of the civilian population. Any effort to win their hearts and minds 
after these actions would most certainly prove futile.  
At the same time, troops are struggling to win the trust and support of 
Afghans; troops feel the need to trust the civilian population as well. One of the 
soldiers mentioned that, “both sides of the fights (U.S. forces and the opposition) 
used civilians in the fight.” In order for either side to be effective they must be 
able to trust and build respect with these civilians. As mentioned in the previous 
section on money and loyalty, many of the troops felt that Afghans played both 
sides for various reasons. This led to distrust among the troops in using civilians 
for support and information. The distrust then led to a loss of respect for Afghans 
as a whole for some of the troops. As a result of these reactions, relationships 
between U.S. forces and civilians would suffer. It could then be analyzed that this 
produced a feedback effect that diminished relations between these groups. As 
soldiers lost trust and respect, they would then tend to interact with Afghans less. 
This would allow the opposition to play bigger roles in the Afghan civilians’ lives, 
swaying them more towards the cause of the opposition. This in turn leads to 
more distrust and the pattern continues.  
Ultimately, one soldier summed up the trust and respect between troops 
and Afghans, asking how can there be trust with “Civil strife, accidental deaths, 
and the galling image of foreign troops present in one's country.” Soldiers realize 
that good relationships are the cornerstone to the hearts and minds strategy; 
however, they also realize that even though the U.S. might have more military 
might than the opposition, winning on the battlefield can have negative effects on 
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with a civilian population. In the end, “Counterinsurgency strategy is about 
commitment, the biggest guy doesn’t always win, the smaller opposition side can 
be more convincing.” 
 Another aspect of loss of trust and respect between troops and Afghans 
came from their daily interactions when working and living together. Issue of 
troops treating Afghans as second-class citizens were noted by a number of 
interviewees: 
So the Afghans clean the restrooms there [on an unnamed U.S. Base]… And 
they [U.S. troops] were disgusting, they wouldn't flush the toilets and they were 
just being huge messes, if you know what I mean, daily. If I was an Afghan 
person cleaning up after these American, Afghan and NATO forces every day, 
day after day, and there was crap everywhere, and he didn't respect the most 
basic function of life that way… I don't know what I would think of us [U.S. troops] 
because it is disgusting. These people [U.S. troops] don't do these things in the 
United States. Part of it was just trying to be mean… (Bravo) 
 
Encounters like this were sure to leave a lasting negative impression on the 
Afghans working on the U.S. bases and ultimately taking these experiences back 
to the communities they lived in.  
 
 
5.5 Cultural Compatibility  
U.S. forces entered Afghanistan under the idea that they are liberators. 
Afghans and even some U.S. troops see the ongoing campaign as occupation. 
What can be agreed on by both sides, according to the troops, is that there is a 
huge cultural divide between the United States and Afghans. This was seen 
through the troops views in three areas; troops appearance, class discrimination, 
and governing styles. In each of these areas troops pointed out divides that 
would negatively affect their relationships with Afghan civilians and their goals of 
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counterinsurgency. After their deployments and experienced express the need 
for U.S. troops to simply, “leave the country and give them back their own way of 
life.” 
When asked what the best action U.S. troops can take to better the 
relationships with Afghan civilians, one respondent wanted to make clear that 
troops not forget that, “we [U.S. forces] are guests in their country.” This idea of 
U.S. troops as guests was then analyzed against the reaction some troops had 
against the appearance of U.S. troops. As troops are deployed in the country, 
they wear military uniforms, carry weapons and drive armored vehicles. This 
combined with living in fortified bases creates an ominous presence to those who 
must now live with it. It can be deduced that any population, Afghans included, 
would have trouble welcoming such a sight in their communities. This scene 
most likely would put a population on the defensive based on first impressions. 
Combine this with a lack of communication due to language barriers and different 
cultural mannerisms and customs and it can be assumed that Afghans would 
tend to trust their own people, oppressors or not, over U.S. troops.  
The next aspect of cultural compatibility, as it relates to how U.S. troops 
related to Afghans, is class discrimination. When asked what negative effects 
U.S. presence can have on Afghanistan, one respondent answered, “Some 
soldiers…treated civilians as lower class because their culture is different than 
ours.”  While not asked this directly, most troops interviewed alluded to the fact 
that they did not have much experience with cultures outside the ones they were 
brought up in. This lack of experience and limited education and training on 
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foreign culture, as mentioned previously, combined to leave troops at a 
disadvantage when asked to interact and relate with local populations. A 
common response to not fully understanding someone’s culture is to treat them 
as if they are not on the same level as you. Troops’ views of a rural Afghan 
lifestyle were sometimes construed in terms of “lower class”, “oppressive towards 
women”, and “poor.” These views can inhibit relationship building on both sides 
of the table. Troops may not come into Afghan communities with an open mind or 
feel that Afghans are on the same level as them, whereas Afghans might 
become defensive towards negative or disrespectful views towards their culture 
or societal values:  
The treatment of women and children was a very big shock to me because I have 
children of my own and it was tough seeing them treated as lower than a dog. 
The women just had no say in anything. I guess it was getting better as time went 
on but it wasn't quite what I expected. You go to another country and you expect 
to be in the United States no matter what. They (The US government and media) 
should tell us you're going to see tough situations and you cannot do anything 
about it; you just have to let it happen… I realized I'm in another country and 
these are their laws. Even if they are totally different than ours I still have my 
beliefs. (Delta) 
 
The last and most common cultural compatibility issue brought up by 
troops surveyed was that of governing styles. Troops quickly realized that 
Afghans did not respond well to the U.S. system of central government. They 
explained that Afghanistan was broken up into many cultures and tribes that had 
few common ideological goals or histories. As troops began building a 
government for Afghans and placing community members in positions of power, 
allegations of abuse of this power along with corruption became common. This 
plan to make Afghans conform to U.S. standards had a negative effect and 
caused a backlash towards troops. One of the troops surveyed explained:  
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Any positive effects will likely be undone when we leave.  Government will 
implode because of corruption.  We've forced democracy on a culture that isn't 
ready or willing to accept democracy.  We have cultivated a whole new 
generation of potential insurgents and terrorists.  
 
This analysis of the situation falls in line with other analysis within this thesis; 
cultural differences can block the formation of relationships and that any actions 
pushed upon a cultural based on preconceived or not fully understood ideals can 
lead to pushback against the ideals and those making the assumptions.  
 
5.6 Danger  
As a result of the Hearts and Minds discourse, troops would be limited to 
strict criteria as to when they could engage Afghans with force. This lead to 
uneasiness within the ranks as troops felt it tied their hands in possible life 
threatening situations. This added danger became a deterrent to troops engaging 
with civilians.  
As a result of this added danger, the majority of troops felt more troops 
and U.S. bases would help with the hearts and minds strategy by making it safer 
for troops to interact with local populations. This, however, would be in direct 
conflict with previous statements about troops being an imposing force over 
civilian populations. It was noted that troops in uniform and bases built near 
communities created distrust and resentment as troops would be viewed as 
occupiers rather than liberators. Now, due to the hearts and minds 
counterinsurgency strategy, troops would be forced to make a decision between 
their safety and liberating a foreign country. One participant, Alpha, described 
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how the dangers of IED’s and the perceptions of those that placed them changed 
his attitude towards the hearts and minds campaign:  
After almost getting blown up I thought it was much more important to appear that I 
trusted those people that I was around, so that they didn't feel that they needed to kill me 
or would want to kill me. (Alpha) 
 
Golf responded with his own take on the situation:  
It is easier to agree with the strategy when the hearts and minds don't shoot back and to 
be gentler with the civilians when you don't have to deal with the civilians and don't worry 
about getting shot or blown up. (Golf) 
 
For the troops, their own personal safety came first, as would be expected. 
However, it is surprising that a strategy would be formed that would place them in 
this dilemma in the first place.  
Another aspect of dangers to troops affecting their ability to efficiently 
employ the hearts and minds strategy is the idea of Afghans helping themselves. 
One respondent noted that, “where U.S./NATO troops have positive interaction, 
we are having success in combating terrorists.” Troops commonly felt that 
positive interactions would lead to better relationships with civilians. This would 
allow troops to share some of the roles and dangers when fighting the opposition. 
Foxtrot added to the danger discussion by describing how the ANA and ANP 
forces helped offset problems faced by U.S. troops. “The Army (ANA) is a 
reasonably respected institution in Afghanistan and the police (ANP) are 
becoming better,” noted Foxtrot, “Actually engaging with the enemy wasn't a 
problem. They never showed cowardice.” Any additional help from Afghans took 
U.S. troops out of dangerous situations. This could free up troops from blame 
during combat operations and allow the troops more of an opportunity to carry 
out operations focused on building a better report with Afghans.  
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 When asked what troops felt the best action Afghan civilians could take to 
better the relationship with U.S. troops, one respondent wanted Afghans to 
“report information of enemy activity and become actively involved in improving 
their own security.” This role sharing, ideally, would prevent troops from being in 
dangerous situations. It would also mean that the troops could achieve the goal 
of handing over all responsibilities of combating operations to the Afghan 
communities themselves.  
Ironically, this would be a similar situation as to how the Taliban, labeled 
by the U.S. as one of the main opposition groups, came into power. The Taliban, 
a group made of mostly Afghans, wanted to police their own country combat the 
oppression of foreign fighters and local warlords. The U.S. still hopes its own 
style of government formed in Afghanistan will take root and allow for a more 
moderate governing of its people. However, one of the troops interviewed noted 
that, “Afghanistan is dangerous and Afghans are experts at insurgency.” Only 
time will tell if the current Afghan government can hold on to power after the U.S. 
troops leave, and if they fail, who will take their place. 
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6. Reflections  
As the thesis concludes, a final analysis will be given tying relevant 
historical facts, prior literature and as well as current discourse and policies to 
that of troop’s experiences in the Afghan conflict. These connections will help 
add to the discussion of problems that arise from foreign intervention and 
imperialistic pursuits under the guise of liberation and counterinsurgency.  
This thesis offers the diverse and synonymous experiences U.S. troops 
have with Afghan society. They are actors and characters in propaganda and 
policy discourses claiming liberation and the battle for Afghan hearts and minds.  
Their identities are shaped through western public imaginations and experiences 
while based as foreign others in Afghanistan promoting a hegemonic vision.  I 
wanted to locate U.S. service members’ perceptions as participants in this war 
and their relationship with Afghan society. Through focusing on their descriptions 
of the roles and groups involved in this relationship, I offer an analysis of the 
gendered nuances and power relationships expected in the propaganda and 
policy. Expectations put forth in the discourses are both reflected and challenged 
in participant’s narratives.  
 The U.S. troops surveyed overwhelmingly believed it was their duty to 
perform missions assigned to them by the U.S. military in Afghanistan.  They did 
not see their presence as one to foster geopolitics or gender justice but instead 
to give freedom to a people who they described as not always welcoming 
towards them. Their shared experience was being the foreign military other in 
Afghanistan during different years with varying responsibilities garnering different 
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proximities and relationships with Afghans. As this project focused on the 
relationship with Afghan society and the described roles and expectations in the 
discourse, it only offers the U.S. perspective which is limited in understanding the 
complex dynamics of the associations. Overall they agreed it was a complicated 
affiliation where they believed in their purpose as liberators while being defined 
by Afghan society as occupiers. While my explanation of the discourses show a 
supportive characterization of troops purpose and roles in Afghanistan, they 
perceived their portrayal in the media to be shallow, unfair and stereotyped. This 
builds upon the idea that Afghan society was objectified in a superficial fashion 
through a gendered dichotomy, obscuring complex systems and identities.  
I asked those surveyed to describe their perceptions of Afghans and 
relationships with their society. The groups defined in the intervention and 
discourses reflected roles based on the vision and expectations of hegemonic 
strategy. The troops reflected as part of the research on themselves as U.S. 
service members as well as, Afghan civilians, insurgents and the government 
and security forces. 
Afghan civilians while portrayed in the propaganda as victims, were only 
sometimes referred to as such by participants. Instead, this description 
complicated the static narrative of the portraying the society through the 
feminine.  Often they were called survivors whose actions were thought of as 
influenced by a combination of politics and ignorance.  Sometimes narratives 
further objectified the people through an infantilized description claiming Afghans 
were helpless without foreign support.  Many participants cited past militaries 
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occupations in Afghanistan is what had led to their present society, impacting 
them in a negative way. However, these militaries were often seen as dissimilar 
interventions. U.S. troops perceived them to be based in Afghanistan to support 
Afghans, not for the direct benefit of the United States. Respondents were 
divided whether or not the people wanted the support of the U.S. troops. Their 
presence, while providing some opportunities for women, also exposed that their 
“restrictive” norms could not just be attributed to Taliban, but Afghan society and 
culture.  Afghan civilians were often described as proud with a strong sense of 
family and community. U.S. troop presence at times shamed these men through 
their mission and combat. While troops believed they themselves reflected 
identities of good guys there to help, they knew very well that Afghans often 
didn't agree. They also were confounded with the predicaments that while 
Afghans suffered before their invasion; their presence also brought fighting and a 
heavy toll on Afghans lives and security. In addition, they could complicate the 
lives of civilians, because asking for their assistance could put them in further 
danger. Many claimed that Afghans loyalty could only be rented not bought. 
Since the hearts and minds doctrine placed a shared responsibility of fighting the 
insurgency between civilians the state and foreign troops, a shared commitment 
was expected. However, civilian allegiances to troops were as neutral as they 
were often towards insurgents. Many explained this as a survival technique by 
the Afghans, albeit a frustrating one in the eyes of U.S. troops, as it hindered 
their vision for success. Loyalty went two ways, and the troops claimed Afghans 
wanted to know how loyal the occupation would be to the people so they could 
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also hedge their bets. Civilians have been used by both sides and assisted the 
hegemony and insurgencies at the same time. 
Troops’ perceptions of the insurgency were fairly synonymous with both 
the propaganda and policy discourses. Nearly all descriptions were about their 
oppression and they were clearly defined as the enemy and “bad guy.” They 
sometimes disagreed with the propaganda that perceived the opposition as 
backwards or stupid, saying that this didn't give them credit for their tactical 
abilities. Respondents said civilians were neutral towards the insurgency due to 
this group’s brutal tactics carried out to coerce support. This group probably had 
the most superficial description offered by U.S. troops and the least amount of 
communication with them. This group, and the perceptions of them, further 
reinforced the troops’ perception of themselves as the obvious good guy against 
this conflicting masculinity. These participants discussed asymmetrical tactics 
used by the insurgency such as blending into the civilian population. They felt 
that this was unfair and that overall the enemy used unconventional tactics that 
were difficult to compete against a large traditional military. Ironically, they did not 
see or comment on how the force of international troops handed down on the 
country was also used asymmetrically in the Afghan arena.  
Participants were most confused by their relationship with and identity of 
the Afghan government and security forces. The discourses had claimed that 
those within this role were partners in Afghan liberation and state-building, and 
therefore wanted a legitimate country with freedoms for its people. However, the 
troops described rampant corruption within this group based on their standards 
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and were unsure if this group was a healthy power structure for the Afghan 
people. In both discourses they had been told that this group was the Afghan 
face of the good guy role. Through this relationship there was often distrust. They 
also heavily agreed that Afghan civilians did not trust or support this group. This 
is problematic for them since this was supposedly the people who would be 
taking over the country once foreign forces exited.  Local tribal leadership on the 
other hand was seen as the best means of a system that works for the people. 
The troops were frustrated by the little connection the Afghan government had 
with its people. This also led to U.S. troop role confusion about the methods of 
liberation through developing a problematic regime and expecting the people to 
support it.  
Base host relationships were further seen as complicated due to cultural 
compatibility. However while the variations of culture were repeated as a reason 
for the problematic relations, power dynamics were not seen as an issue. There 
was little recognition of imperialism or occupation, other than knowing that people 
inside and outside perceived them in that similar role. Participants either 
reinforced a dehumanizing or simple characterization of Afghans and superior 
ideas of the U.S. or prided themselves on a deep analysis and understanding of 
their humanity based on their read and experienced knowledge of the people. 
Education was a common theme and many answered that it was needed to 
improve this relationship, whether it was teaching troops to be more respectful to 
their host society or for Afghans to improve their livelihoods.  In conclusion I 
would like to offer the troops responses to the tea party exercise. 




6.1 The Tea Party  
Some of the troops interviewed through e-mail were given the opportunity 
to describe their thoughts on Afghanistan and their own perceptions of their time 
in the country.  These are reflections after they have returned home to the U.S., 
their memories of serving in Afghanistan based on experiences that occurred 
months to a decade earlier.  This exercise allows soldiers to add their own 
conclusions and thoughts to the process of this study. The questions posed to 
the respondents are as follows:  
If you were to be the host one Afghan person for tea, who would it be? Use your 
imagination please.  I want you to describe to me the: who, what, why, when, 
where, and how of this encounter.  Imagine you are unrestricted by language.  
No translator needed. How would you dress? How would they? Describe this 
person for me. You could have met this person or they could be based on your 
knowledge or perception of Afghans. It could be an average citizen or public 
figure. Whoever you personally if given the chance would want to talk to. They 
could be in any group whether devout to opposition, corruption, civil or civilian 
Life? Man or woman, you have the opportunity to communicate freely with this 
person. What American and Afghan cultural norms would you include? What 
would you talk about? What would you say about your time in Afghanistan and 
interpretation of their culture? Would weapons be present? How would you sit? 
Describe the scenario and your related emotions. 
 
Below are the responses for those troops that decided to participate. These are 
unedited to allow the troops to have their voices, often overshadowed or hidden 
by discourse, media or social constructs, heard in full.  
Right now I don't have a burning desire to talk with anyone in Afghanistan.  It 
might be interesting to talk with an Al-Qaeda leader and see why they do what 
they do.  (Bravo) 
 
 Bravo’s response shows a disinterest in communicating directly with people but 
rather with engaging the idea of terrorism and its basis through the group 
becoming symbolic of the term in the last decade Al Qaeda. Asking to speak with 
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leadership and their actions source reveals that troops may feel confused by the 
actual reasons behind political violence as opposed to the rhetoric offered usually 
on superficial levels of Islamic extremism and hating American freedom.  
I don’t really know how to approach this.  I can say without a shadow of a doubt 
that there isn’t a single Afghan, living, dead, real, or archetypal that I would ever 
want to sit down and have tea with.  If forced into such an encounter, I would 
dress as I do normally today, in a polo and cargo pants.  In regards to norms, I 
would treat the whole encounter no differently than having coffee (I hate tea) with 
anyone else. Pre-arranged meeting in a coffee shop, sit at a table, etc (no way in 
hell is an Afghan getting in my house).  No weapons, not really necessary.  I 
don’t think I would talk about anything.  Just drink silently, stare at them, and 
leave.  At the end of the day, despite two years and three months in their country 
I have no interest in the Afghan people, no common ground, no shared 
experience, no nostalgia for that shit hole place or its residents. (Golf) 
 
 Once again a different interviewee is disinterested in meeting an Afghan after 
they have returned home, adamantly this time.  Golf uses the word ‘forced’ to 
describe what kind of encounter would take place if he were made to do so.  He 
would make the meeting public and would refuse ever letting an Afghan into his 
home. The level of distrust here is strong even at an imaginative level, further 
complicating Alpha Yankee explanations on trust and respect.  This comment is 
especially interesting in that foreign militaries have a certain expectation and self-
asserted right to enter the homes of Afghans either peacefully or destructively as 
part of their missions and security measures.  He goes on to explain if he were 
sitting with them he would refuse to speak to them.  This exemplifies how difficult 
the relationship between foreign troops and Afghans must have been and the 
public and political expectations to build a state through this association. 
If I were to host an Afghan for a tea party, it would either be an ANA or an ANP 
commander.  I would host these people because they are in my mind the most 
important people in helping coalition forces leave Afghanistan in a relatively 
peaceful state.  I would hold this tea party at one of their bases so that I can see 
the status of their forces first hand and judge what more can be done to 
strengthen their forces.  I would hold this meeting at their bases because it might 
help reinforce the idea that they will have to take the lead when we leave their 
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country.  Many ANA or ANP assume that the coalition forces will continue to 
supply them after we have left and will give them our equipment when we leave, 
and they rely on coalition forces to supply them with the resources needed to 
sustain operations.  By holding the meeting at their base, they will not see what 
coalition forces have and then I can explain to them that the equipment that we 
use will be taken with us, and they will have to set up their own logistical system 
to sustain themselves.   
For greetings, I would shake their hand first and then place my hand over 
my heart and nod, which is what I have seen many Afghans do.  I would hold the 
tea party on a table and chairs instead of on the ground with pillows and sitting 
Indian style, because while local elders may do this, I believe that the ANA and 
the ANP would look more professional by sitting at a table with chairs.  First I 
would talk about any personal matters about the person I am talking with, such 
as family and health, to help connect with this person.  Then I would discuss 
military matters such as training, logistics, planned operations and how they can 
take more responsibility. Personally, during this type of encounter I would try to 
be as diplomatic as possible, but I know I would feel a little frustrated because to 
me the ANA and the ANP still rely on coalition forces to much and that they don't 
want to make the necessary changes to help their own forces.   
I would not personally be armed to show that I can trust them but the 
people with me would be armed because of incidents of ANA or ANP shooting at 
coalition forces.  I would not tell them about how I feel about certain aspects of 
their culture because I believe that this might upset them and I would like to 
maintain as good as relationship as possible. (Hotel) 
 
 Hotel changes the course of these responses in wanting to engage with 
someone that troops have a high level of contact with the Afghan National 
Security Forces.  His request to hold the meeting on their base as opposed to an 
American base is to not encourage the Afghan commander to believe he can 
keep American resources after the withdrawal.  He encourages their self-
sustainability and reinforces that throughout the response that in order to be 
successful, Afghan forces will need to implement their own logistics.  These 
comments relay the tension of dependence that has been built up through the 
war between not only militaries but also governments.  He mentions developing a 
rapport with them first to develop a connection and believes that sitting in chairs 
and tables is more professional for members of the military than the traditional 
seating for tea.  However, he shows a balance to this Western standard by 
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saying that he would mimic an Afghan greeting of respect after shaking their 
hand. 
I find this question a bit weird. I have had tea with many Afghanis. I don't see how 
having a hypothetical tea party is really relevant unless this is a psychological 
experiment. It you want me to go into detail about my actual experience with 
locals during meetings that included tea, please don't hesitate to ask. 
 However, if I was able to host one Afghan person for tea it would be 
whoever is currently the most influential and effective Taliban leader. I would let 
him have a sip of tea, then promptly kill him. (Mike) 
 
Mike is put off by the question and finds the experiment irrelevant. However his 
response is incredibly poignant. His guest would be a dominant Taliban leader in 
order to kill him, only “letting” him first sip his tea.  This answer explains how 
troops still despise and want to kill their enemy even when they are  no longer in 
the same arena.  This response summarizes how soldiers in the study viewed 
their opponents – they still discredit them and their intense opinions about them 
remain.   
Complicated question that deserves a simple answer, I think.  I would choose to 
sit with a young Afghan man, perhaps thirty-five, who has seen the evolution of 
his nation’s history close up for the past twenty-years.  I would dress in Afghan 
dress, ideally, which simply means the loose fitting pants and shirt, a vest, and 
appropriate hat.  I would bring with me pictures of my family and my home, as 
well as modest gifts, to share with him.  I would want to have traditional Afghan 
music playing, live, in the background.  There would be weapons present, I 
imagine, but they would be set aside, out of reach, as a matter of trust.   
 I would hope to engage in a very, very long and deliberate conversation 
with this individual in a way that makes clear my genuine interest in his thoughts, 
experiences, background, hopes and fears, interests, family and friends.  
Likewise, I would want to share with him my experiences in his country, as well 
as my experiences in life outside of Afghanistan and, then, try to communicate 
how, in my view, my interaction with him and his country is as valuable to me as 
any other experience I’ve enjoyed in my life.  I think it would be difficult to 
communicate my personal sense of genuine admiration for him and his country 
and its people, as well as for the incredible challenges they have endured over 
the decades, but I would try to accomplish that. 
 I would want to speak his language – though I do not, right now – rather 
than expecting him to speak mine, and I would like to have enough expertise with 
his traditions to ensure that he knows I know his traditions, respect them, and 
find them productive and useful.   
 And, I would want to do this more than once – often – to build a true 
friendship with this young man and, hopefully, he might one day visit me and my 
family in the United States. 
 I think that would be about perfect. (Oscar) 




 Oscar’s answer is by far one of the most optimistic scenarios.  This participant 
genuinely believed in the potential for what had been imagined for Afghanistan in 
an ideal hegemonic intervention that allowed for a successful transition of power.  
He shows a genuine interest in understanding Afghanistan and its people and 
this offer the opportunity to do so it would be interesting to see his reflection on 
what he learned.  For as much as U.S. troops can understand about Afghanistan, 
what can these lessons teach outsiders about intervention?  As the cycle of 
these endeavors continue, it seems as though lessons learned are not absorbed 
into prevention of further hegemonic incursions tragic to these host communities 
and the foreign militaries that reside on their land.  Oscar relies heavily on 
mimicking in this scenario as a way to develop comfort and build rapport with his 
guest, describing the most orientalist practices of these encounters.  He seems 
to desperately want to communicate well with great understanding and also to be 
understood; although he seems to have a certain sorrow in perhaps not being 
able to covey his empathy for Afghan’s history.  Although he would be wearing 
Afghan garb, he doesn’t comment on if his identity is problematic in this 
encounter or Afghan history as a member of a foreign military.  He seems to 
genuinely want to develop a relationship through trust and respect as opposed to 
trying to win his heart or mind for military strategy.  I am unsure how many troops 
feel they would want to have a similar scenario, but Oscar seems to break down 
the personal barriers and animosity that many troops explained being built up 
through the course of the war in their opinions about Afghans. 
I would choose to speak to Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of Panjshir.  I 
imagine that he would be dressed as he usually was in life--Pashtun garb with a 
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vest and some military gear.  He would be wearing a sweet pakool (the Pashtun 
hat) that I always saw him wearing in photos.  As far as weapons, I wouldn't be 
too concerned with having one.  Had he not been assassinated on September 9, 
2001, I think that he would have been our biggest supporter and a natural choice 
for President of Afghanistan.  
We would ideally be at one of his base camps, sitting under some trees 
or on the wall of a centuries old fortress made out of mud and stone.  We'd drink 
tea, of course, and hopefully there would be lamb for dinner.  I miss lamb from 
the Middle East and Afghanistan.  Lamb over here just doesn't ever taste as 
good. 
  As far as conversation, I would like to ask him how he sees Afghanistan 
fitting into our ever shrinking world and where he sees his countrymen in 50 
years.  Would he have any recommendations for how to help his nation develop, 
or would he advocate leaving his country as it is, free from the pressures and 
stresses that education and entrance into the global economy surely brings?  I 
would share my concerns--focused mainly on the lack of education, the 
dangerous mixture of politics and religion, and his country's lack of respect for 
women.  I would also want to know about his feelings towards the NGO's present 
in his country during a time of war, and whether he felt the charity was of net 
benefit or ultimately fostered a dependence upon outside assistance, eroding 
Afghan "self-reliance." 
  Finally, if I could go back in time to have this conversation in August of 
2001, I would tell Ahmad not to trust Arabs in his country.  There aren't too many 
Arabs in Afghanistan that aren't there to foment trouble or push their own 
ideological agenda.  Of course, the same could be said about us, but I like to feel 
that we have the benefit of at least not being the types of folks that pose as 
journalists and then detonate bombs hidden inside of video cameras.  Of course, 




My choice would be the Lion of Panjshir – Ahmad Shah Massoud. 
  As his biographer states, “an engineering student turned military leader 
who played a vital role in driving the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan.” Moreover, 
“he strongly rejected the interpretations of Islam followed by the Taliban, or Al 
Qaeda.” 
  With a little research, one can easily see the impact Ahmad had on, not 
only the local population, but the Afghanistan populous. 
  To sit down and have tea, or chi, would be a momentous experience, 
indeed. He is one of few people who, in recent history, has been able to bring the 
population together, regardless of tribal affiliation for the betterment of the 
country. That, in and of itself, is noteworthy to a more in-depth conversation. 
He was a student – I am a student. 
He was a seeker – I am a seeker. 
He was healer – I am a healer. 
He is a warrior – I am a warrior. 
  To this end, it appears that his ideological beliefs and my own run 
parallel and we would have much in common. 
  To Ahmad, I would thank him for allowing me time in his beautiful country 
because, as a result of my time there, my life has drastically and forever been 
changed for the better. No longer do I take things for granted and let time slowly 
slip away. Now I seize every opportunity to make my life, and the lives of those 
around me, better – as it appears he did, also. 
  There would absolutely not be any weapons present – period. 
  My emotional state would be inquisitive, curious, and happy. 
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  My body language would mimic his and we would sit crossed-legged on 
the floor or seated at a table; whatever he chose. 
  My underlying goal would just be to learn about him, why he believes 
what he does, and hopeful utilize that knowledge in my everyday life. I would also 
want to impart some knowledge I’ve gained and bridge a connection with him, 
ensuring us more opportunities to talk and learn from one another. 
  To summarize, I would like to use his quote as it serves to only reiterate 
why I would want to talk and learn from him:  
“It is our conviction and we believe that both men and women 
are created by the Almighty. Both have equal rights. Women can pursue 
an education, women can pursue a career, and women can play a role in 
society -- just like men.” (Whiskey) 
 
Uniform and Whiskey both want to meet the same man, posthumously, Ahmad 
Shah Massoud.  How these troops describe him and they both happened to ask 
to meet him is not coincidental, reflecting the iconization of the anti-Taliban 
leader who was killed two days before 9/11 by al-Qaeda.  They both paint a 
romanticized notion of the man who has become symbolic in the fight against the 
Taliban.  Their flattery shows how a man that was never met but yet idolized by 
the troops in that they have shared the same enemy.  As Massoud didn’t live to 
see the invasion, his response or approach to assisting the U.S. is speculative. 
However they describe a man that would have been a benevolent ally, in their 
imaginations they assume a commonality with Massoud and are pained that the 
U.S. and Afghanistan never had the alliance they believe they would have had he 
lived with Afghanistan.  These responses highlight how strong the narratives of 
heroic and villainous masculinity have been in the perceptions of U.S. troops.  
Their accounts of Massoud fail to mention his own track record as a warlord 
unpopular with many Afghans and seem him in a light of virtue and heroism  
(Cunningham 2013). 
 
I would want to meet with Gul Wali.  He was the director of the National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) at Torkham Gate.  I worked with Gul on my 2nd 
deployment to Afghanistan.  We met every day and worked together to make our 
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mission successful.  Gul was extremely dedicated to his work and to helping 
American troops. 
I would want to meet with him just like we used to.  I would go down to 
Torkham Gate and meet him at the gate of his compound and hug.  He would 
invite me in and would have his workers lay out a spread of food and tea.  We 
would sit on the floor and just chat about life (no business) and eat.  We would 
not discuss work or operational stuff until the end.   
I get pretty nostalgic about this a lot of times.  Life just seemed simpler 
then compared to now even though it was dangerous.  I imagine that Gul and I 
could just meet right now and pick up where we left off.  Gul was generous 
enough to give me some Afghan gifts when I left including some gifts for my 
family. (Victor) 
 
Victor offered the only response of an Afghan he actually personally knew and 
worked with.  His narrative is unique in that he believed a genuine rapport had 
been developed with this man during his deployment.  The close contact he 
wanted to share was exclusive in this response.  His nostalgia contradicts those 
who want to avoid Afghans after their time in the arena as he wants to “pick up” 
the relationship where he left off.  His memories include a genuine fondness with 
an Afghan person he worked with and come to know on some personal level, 
which seems unique in these relationships. Although business would be on the 
docket, he didn’t include comments that he had to be critical or give lessons to 
Mr. Gul Wali. 
 
6.2 Future Study  
 While I believe this study provided insight into troops’ views on a variety of 
subjects regarding their roles in Afghanistan and foreign policy as a whole, this 
study has revealed areas of future study. With proper access and resources, a 
parallel study from the Afghan point of view could be very informational with 
regards to these topics. Afghans would have different experiences, access, and 
perceptions to the chain of events studied in this thesis. Having firsthand 
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knowledge of the relationships formed with U.S. troops could complete the 
picture and be compared to those given by the respondents here. Surveys and 
interviews with Afghans could confirm or disprove soldiers’ ideas towards each of 
the Afghan groups mentioned. These results could be valuable in identifying 
which of the troop’s viewpoints were perceived or factual. They could also 
provide understandings of alternate roles and gender not identified through the 
experiences of American troops. 




7. References  
"About RAWA." 15 Mar. 2010. Web. <http://www.rawa.org/rawa.html>. 
Abu-Lughod, Lila. "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological 
Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others." American 
Anthropologist 104.3 (2002). Print. 
Alfsen, Marianne. "Exit Afghanistan." Perspective 3 Nov. 2011: 14-23. 
Perspective. Norwegian Refugee Council. Web. 25 Feb. 2013. 
Alpha. Personal interview. Apr. 2011. 
Barakat, Sultan, and Gareth Wardell. "Exploited by Whom? An Alternative 
Perspective on Humanitarian Assistance to Afghan Women." Third World 
Quarterly 23.5 (2002): 909-30. Print. 
Baron, Kevin. "Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, 30 Apr. 2013. 
Web. 5 May 2013. 
Bearden, Milton. "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires." Foreign Affairs Nov. & 
Dec. 2001. Print. 
Boal, Mark. "The Kill Team: How U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent 
Civilians." Rolling Stone 27 Mar. 2011. Web. 
Bose, Srinjoy. "Collateral Damage in Afghanistan: A Blow to the Battle for Hearts 
and Minds." Collateral Damage in Afghanistan: A Blow to the Battle for 
Hearts and Minds by Srinjoy Bose. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
8 Mar. 2007. Web. 22 May 2013. 
 
  Sarah Cosette  101 
 
 
Bravo. Email interview. 15 Jan. 2012. 
---. Personal interview. Apr. 2011.  
 Brittain, Victoria. Shadow Lives, London: Pluto Press, 2013.  
 
Brown , J. 3 Jan 2012. 
<http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation Enduring 
Freedom.htm>.  
Bush, George. United States Congress. Washington DC. 20 Sep 2001. Speech.  
Calder, Kent. Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American 
Globalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print. Chapter 4 
and 6 (p 79-96; 126-163). 
Conetta, Carl "Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the Afghanistan war", Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth 
Institute Project on Defense AlternativesResearch Monograph #6, 30 
January 2002. URL: http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.pdf 
Charlie. Personal interview. Apr. 2011. 
Cloud, Dana. "“To Veil the Threat of Terror”: Afghan Women and the Clash of 
Civilizations in the Imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism." Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 90.3 (2004): 285-306. Print. 
Coleman, Lara and Bassi, Serena A.. (2011) Deconstructing militant manhood. 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol.13 (No.2). pp. 204-224.  
Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin 
Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: 
Penguin, 2004. Print. 
  Sarah Cosette  102 
 
 
Cooley, Alexander. Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military 
Overseas. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1008. 18. Print. 
Cunningham, Erin. "Ahmad Shah Massoud, Assassinated by Al Qaeda but No 
Friend of the US." The National. 6 Sept. 2011. Web. 15 May 2013. 
Delta. Personal interview. May 2011. 
Dixon, Paul. "Hearts and Minds versus Ultimate Force." Tribune 21 Sept. 2009. 
Web. 
Echo. Personal interview. May 2011. 
Enloe, Cynthia H. Does Khaki Become You?: The Militarization of Women's 
Lives. Boston, MA: South End, 1983. Print. 
--- Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives. Berkeley: 
University of California, 2000. Print. 
--- Updating the Gendered Empire: Where Are the Women in Occupied 
Afghanistan and Iraq? in: The Curious Feminist , UC Press, 2005  
Exum, Andrew. "Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Explaining the Absence of 
Victory." Politique Etrangere 76.2 (2011). Print. 
Foxtrot. Personal interview. May 2011. 
Furgeson, James. "The Reconstruction of Afghanistan: From War to a 
Dependent Demcracy." 2007. Lecture.  
Galula, David. COUNTER- INSURGENCY WARFARE Theory and Practice. 
London: Frederick Praeger, 1964. Print.  
Golf. Email interview. 12 April 2011. 
--- Personal interview. May 2011. 
  Sarah Cosette  103 
 
 
Hawkins, Awr. "Panetta Announces Women Allowed in Combat Roles, McCain 
Supports." Beitbart. N.p., 24 Jan 2013. Web. 10 February 2013. 
<http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/01/24/Mothers-In-Foxholes-
Women-In-Combat>.  
Hehir, Aidan (2007) 'The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A 
Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom', Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding, 1:3, 307 – 332 
Hirschkind, Charles, and Saba Mahmood. "Feminism, the Taliban, and Politics of 
Counter-Insurgency." Anthropological Quarterly 75.2 (2002): 339-54. Print. 
Hotel. Email interview. 18 Jan. 2012. 
---  Personal interview. May 2011. 
India. Personal interview. May 2011. 
 Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan. New 
York: W.W. Norton &, 2009. Print. 
Khalili, Laleh. "Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency." Review of 
International Studies. (2011): 1-21. Print.  
---. "The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency." Middle East Report. 255 
(2010): 14-23. Print.  
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print. 
Kirk, Michael. "Transcript: The War Behind Closed Doors." Frontline. PBS, 8 Jan 
2003. Web. 14 July 2012. 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/script.html>.  
  Sarah Cosette  104 
 
 
Kolhatkar, Sonali, and James Ingalls. Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, 
Warlords, and the Propaganda of Silence. New York: Seven Stories, 
2006. Print. 
Kreisher, Otto. "Breaking Defense." Breaking Defense. Breaking Media, 7 Oct. 
2011. Web. 22 Feb. 2013. 
Kumar, Deepa, and Carol Stabile. "Unveiling Imperialism: Media, Gender and the 
War on Afghanistan." Media, Culture & Society. 27.5 (2005): 765-782. 
Print. 
Lutz, Catherine. The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military 
Bases, New York: NYU Press, 2009.  Ch 8 (p 243-269)  
Mike. Email interview. 17 Jan. 2012. 
Murphy, Thomas. United States. Army. Afghan Cultural Newsletter. Fort 
Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2010. Print. 
Nagl, John. "Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3-24." NDU Press. 
National Defense Unity Press. Web. 16 October 2012. 
<http://www.ndu.edu/press/constructing-3-24.html>.  
Oscar. Email interview. 25 Jan. 2012. 
Pat Tillman Foundation, . N.p.. Web. 6 Oct 2011. 
<http://www.pattillmanfoundation.org/>.  
Petraeus, David Howell., and James F. Amos. Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24 
(2006). Boulder, CO: Paladin, 2009. Print. 
  Sarah Cosette  105 
 
 
Puar, Jasbir K., and Amit S. Rai. "Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism 
and the Production of Docile Patriots." Social Text 20.3 72 (2002): 117-48. 
Print. 
Radio Address by Mrs. Bush. Crawford, Texas, 17 Nov. 2001. Radio.  
Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. 
New York: Yale UP, 2001. Print. 
Ross, Robert. "Pashtunwali and the American Military." MA thesis. George 
University, 2010. Print.  
Roth, Kenneth. "The Law of War in the War on Terror: Washington's Abuse of 
"Enemy Combatants"" Foreign Affairs 83.1 (2004): 2-7. Print. 
Spivak, Gayatri. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Marxism and the Interpretation of 
Culture. Ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana: University of 
Illinois, 1988. Print. 
Stanglin, Douglas. "Al-Jazeera: Taliban offered to give up bin Laden before 
9/11." On Deadline. USA Today, 11 Sep 2011. Web. 22 May 2013. 
<http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/09/al-
jazeera-report-taliban-offered-to-give-up-bin-laden-for-trial-before-911/1 
Suhrke, Astri. "The Democratization of a Dependent State: The Case of 
Afghanistan." Fride. (2007): n. page. Print.  
Uniform. Email interview. 6 Jan. 2012. 
Victor. Email interview. 28 Dec. 2011. 
Whiskey. Email interview. 17 Jan. 2012. 
  Sarah Cosette  106 
 
 
Wilson, Scott, and Michael Shear. n.d., n. pag. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/23/AR2010062300689.html>. 
"World shock over U.S. attacks." CNN. 11 9 2011: n. page. Web. 22 May. 2013. 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/11/trade.centre.reaction
/index.html>. 
Young, Iris Marion. "The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the." 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 29.1 (2003). Print. 





8. List of Abbreviations 
ANA   Afghan National Army 
ANP   Afghan National Police 
ANSF   Afghan National Security Forces 
AQ   Al Qaeda  
COIN   Counterinsurgency 
DOD   Department of Defense 
GWOT  Global War on Terror 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Orginzation 
OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom 
RAWA  Revolutionary Afghan Womens Association 





9. Appendix A: Base Host Relationships in Afghanistan (Survey) 




The American University in Cairo 




Welcome to “Base Host Relationships in Afghanistan," an academic study that examines some of the intimate dynamics between American soldiers 
and Afghan civilians during the current conflict. This study is being conducted by Ms. Sarah Cosette in Las Vegas, Nevada as part of her graduate 
degree requirements at the American University in Cairo. Before taking part in this study, please read the consent form below and sign/print your 
name at the bottom of the page if you understand the statements and freely consent to participate in the study. 
Base Host Study 
 
2. Consent Agreement 
  
Consent Form 
This study involves survey and interview based research designed to understand how American soldiers define their roles as soldiers in foreign 
military installations. How do they perceive cultural understanding, communal relations and their affect on Afghan civilians the country? In 
addition how are American soldiers and veterans affected by Afghan civilians and communities? The study is being conducted by Ms. Sarah 
Cosette, a master’s degree candidate of The American University in Cairo (AUC). It has been approved by the AUC Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
No deception is involved, and the study understands the risk to participants as follows. 
 
This survey and or interview will ask you to recall experiences and perceptions based on your familiarity and memories while as a military member 
in Afghanistan. These recollections may promote a range of emotions. While the intent of this study is not to inconvenience you in any manner, 
the researcher acknowledges that the questions may cause discomfort either now or after the study. Please skip questions that you prefer not to 
answer or stop if you wish to discontinue the survey or interview at any time. Please return the survey, whether it has been fully completed or not to 
the test administrator. 
 
Please accept a list of resources available to veterans. Some of these listings will be indicated as especially helpful when supporting emotional 
and stress related counseling services. Please contact these organizations with any questions about all that they have to offer since they operate to 
serve you. 
 
Participation in the survey typically takes 45 minutes. Participants’ real names will not be used in any part of the results or published work. In fact, 
names are not asked for and your identity is strictly anonymous unless you indicate your willingness to participate in the personal interview and 
discuss the subjects of the study more thoroughly. The principal investigator, her assistant and academic advisor will exclusively know these 
participants by name. All other parties involved and those reviewing the findings whether the project is in draft or completed form will know your 
responses by an identification number or manufactured named. Participants begin by answering a series of questions about their personal 
demographics. The remaining five sections will consist of various questions related to base host relationships in Afghanistan. 
 
At the end of the survey, participants have the option to leave their contact information if they wish to be interviewed further on these subjects. If 
you agree to a personal interview you will have the opportunity to discuss anonymously the subject of this study and provide a more detailed 
context so that the research report reflects deeper background and description than what is based solely on the survey. If you want to be considered 
for an interview, please leave your contact information on the last page and your schedule and what city you live in. Your consideration for all your 
involvement and service is respected and the desired outcome of this study is designed to benefit both military and foreign host communities. 
Interviews will assist and further support the need to provide context for this social study. While responses and results will be discussed and 
published in the paper, in no case will responses be attributed to individual participants. 
  
If participants have further questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge a complaint or concern, they may contact the principal 
investigator, Ms. Cosette. Her email related to this study is basehoststudy@gmail.com and her office phone number is 702-637-6540. The 
academic advisor for the project is Dr. Amy Homes, Academic Advisor and Professor at AUC’s Department of Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology 
and Egyptology. Her contact information is: holmes@aucegypt.edu. 
 
Please proceed to the next page to begin the survey after selecting the following option.  
*1. If you are 18 years of age or older, understand the statements above, and freely 
consent to participate in the study, please sign and print your name and checkmark the "I 
Agree" box. 
  
If you do not want to participate in this survey, please sign and print your name and 
checkmark the "I Do Not Agree" box. Please proceed to return the survey to Ms. Cosette 




I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY AND COMPLETE THE ATTACHED SURVEY.  
mlj I DO NOT AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY AND WILL NOT COMPLETE THE ATTACHED SURVEY. 
Base Host Study 
 
3. AFGHAN SERVICE 
  






mlj    No 
Base Host Study 
 
4. DEMOGRAPHIC & BACKGROUND INFO 
  
1. Your current age: 
 
mlj 18-23 mlj 24-29 mlj 30-35 mlj 36-41 mlj 42+   
2. Are you: 
 
mlj Male mlj Female   
3. Military Status: 
 
mlj Current Military mlj Veteran   




Please answer the following questions based on your circumstances while serving in the American military ONLY while in Afghanistan. 
 
5. Branch: (Choose all that apply) 
 
fec Army fec Navy fec Marine Corps fec Air Force fec Coast Guard   
6. Age while actively in Afghanistan: (Choose all that apply) 
 
fec 18-23 fec 24-29 fec 30-35 fec 36-41 fec 42+   
7. Base Structure(s) type that you lived in: (FOB, COB, Outpost etc) 















8. Which regions did you serve in while in Afghanistan. (Please mark all that apply) 
 
fec Northwestern Region  
fec Northeastern Region  
fec Central Region (Kabul)  
fec Western Region  
fec Eastern Region  
fec Southern Region  
fec Not Sure   
9. What year or years have you served in Afghanistan? (Please check all that apply) 
 
fec 2001 fec 2002 fec 2003 fec 2004 fec 2005 cfe 2006 fec 2007 fec 2008 fec 2009 fec 2010 fec    20   
10. Average Distance between your base and Afghan community(ies): 
   
11. Afghans that you personally interacted with: (Civilians, Opposition Forces, Afghan 
Military and Police etc) 
  Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly Never N/A 
Civilian Men nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
Civilian Women mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
Opposition Forces nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
Afghan Military and Police mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
Base Host Study 
 
12. How was your time spent with local Afghan civilians: 
Base Host Study 
 
5. BASE HOST RELATIONSHIPS & CIVILIAN SUPPORT 
  
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  
The American described, “Mission to Win the Hearts & Minds of the Afghan People is….” 
  Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree N/A 
Important nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
Possible mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
An effective and successful 
military strategy 
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
Working well while you were 
deployed in the country 
mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
 




mlj Not Sure   
3. The American described, “Mission to Win the Hearts & Minds of the Afghan People….” 
  More Less Same Not Sure 
Works better with more, less nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
or the same number of    
soldiers?        
Works better with more, less mlj mlj mlj mlj 
or the same number of    
bases?        
Is more effective from the nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
use of more or less    
combat?        
Needs more or less mlj mlj mlj mlj 
American Non-Military    
efforts?        
Needs more or less security nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
contract firms assisting US    
Military?        
 
4. What do you feel is the BEST action American troops can take- to better the 
relationships with Afghan civilians? 
  
5. What do you feel is the WORST action American troops can take- that would result in 
harming the relationships with Afghan civilians? 
Base Host Study 
 
6. What do you feel is the BEST action Afghan civilians can take- to better the relationships 
with American troops? 
  
7. What do you feel is the WORST action Afghan civilians can take- that would result in 
harming the relationships with American troops? 
  
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
8. Based on your experiences, do you think Afghan communities trust and support… 
  Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree N/A 
Their current national 
government? 
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
Afghan National Army and 
the Afghan National 
Police? 
mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
Local Tribal Leadership? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
Taliban and opposition 
forces? 
mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
American military forces? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
NATO/ISAF? mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
Base Host Study 
 
6. PREPARATION & EDUCATION 
  
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree N/A 
 
It is important for American 
forces to receive education 
and training about their 
host community, society 
and culture. 
You received enough 
training about Afghan 
community, society and 
culture BEFORE you came 
to Afghanistan. 
You received enough 
training about Afghan 
community; society and 
culture WHILE you were in 
Afghanistan. 
 










nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
 
2. What areas of training and education would you have liked more training on to assist 
you with your goals in Afghanistan? 
   
3. What is something you wish Afghan civilians better understood about you? 
   
4. What is something you wish you could better understand about Afghan civilians? 
Base Host Study 
 
7. MISSION: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
  
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree N/A 
The Afghan people 
SHOULD be liberated. 
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
The Afghan people WANT 
to be liberated. 
mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj mlj 
It is the responsibility of 
American forces to bring 
justice to Afghanistan. 
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj 
 
2. Who or what do Afghan civilians need to be protected from? 
   
Some of you may have had the opportunity to interact with a range of different groups that make up Afghan society. If this is the case: you may 
describe general or average qualities across the country- or you may indicate and describe the group you were most familiar with. 
 
3. Briefly describe Afghan men’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc): 
   
4. Briefly describe Afghan women’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc): 
   
5. Briefly describe the Afghan youth’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc): 
   
6. Briefly describe Afghan society, culture and values: 
Base Host Study 
 
8. US FORCES PURPOSE & RESPONSIBILITY 
  
1. What do you feel is the primary purpose the American Government has for deploying 
American forces to Afghanistan? 
   
2. What are positive effects of American troop presence in Afghanistan? 
  
 
3. What are negative effects of American troop presence in Afghanistan? 
  
 
4. Briefly describe American soldiers in Afghanistan (personality, attitude, manners, etc): 
   
Various voices that discuss and debate this conflict offer opposing labels about American military presence in Afghanistan. On one end some offer 
the term "occupation" while those that disagree may describe it as "liberation." 
 
5. Do you see yourself and actions more as those of an occupier or liberator? 
 
mlj Occupier mlj Liberator mlj Both mlj Neither  




6. Do you believe American military operations in Afghanistan will have a lasting impact on 
the country even after troops are gone? 
 
mlj Yes  





7. What impact will or has Afghanistan or the people had on you after your presence 
there? 
Base Host Study 
 
9. IN CLOSING 
  





PHONE and/or EMAIL:  
2. Please write any additional information or comments here that you would like to offer or 
want to explain more thoroughly. 
  
 
3. Please type your email address here if you would like a listing of resources available to 
veterans sent to you. 
Sarah Cosette       120 
10. Appendix B: Interview Questions 
1) Do you feel the average Afghan understands why foreign militaries are 
present in their country? Please explain why or why not? 
2) How do American government agencies (DOJ, USAID, and State Dept. 
etc) relate to the Afghan population? How is this knowledge used in policy 
and procedure? 
3) Do you feel tribal and local leadership is connected or has enough say in 
the GIRoA? Was it possible to balance tribal systems with a central unified 
power? 
4) Based on your experiences and observations, what role does Islam play in 
Afghan society?  
5) What are your observances and opinions related to Afghans administering 
power currently and after American forces exit? 
6) Where are efforts best spent in Afghanistan? If you could devote more or 
less resources where and with whom would they be? 
7) Please expand on the concept that it is difficult to for Afghans to 
understand troops presence and difficult for troops to understand Afghans 
allegiances and fluid nature towards troops and insurgents. 
8) Do you feel gender and cultural norms dictate that Afghan women are kept 
segregated and hidden because of the current and historical dangers in 
the country (war, soldiers, tribal conflict) or because it is a social practice 
to keep women as second class citizens? Also explain if both or neither of 
these assumptions is true. 
9) What is the reality of insurgency?  Describe how and why there is a blend 
of civilians and Taliban within the opposition? Did you find that civilians 
believed in Taliban ideology and leadership or were making alliances for 
survival and esteem?  
10) What is the reality of counter insurgency?  Did you find Afghan civilians to 
invest in the American mission? Did they seem to react differently towards 
your presence when “hearts and minds” was practiced? Please expand on 
the assessment of the “hearts and minds” campaign in Afghanistan that 
you offered in the survey.  
11) What advice & warnings would you tell future generations of either 
American or foreign troops that may be deployed to Afghanistan either 5 
months or 500 years from now? 
12) What are the three main priorities you see as what needs to be focused on 
with American service members and veterans? What do you want 
understood about yourselves? (Both in the USA & internationally)  It can 
or cannot include your time in Afghanistan. Please share. 
